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Abstract 
The paper analyses the public section of the 2015, 2016 and 2017 resolution plans of the eight 
largest US Global Systemically Important Banks. It unfolds the beneficial effects that the statutory 
obligation to draft such plans had on the rationalisation of groups structure and on US G-SIBs 
insolvency preparedness. However, the detailed analysis of those plans also shows how banks have 
almost uniformly chosen a Single point of Entry (SPOE) resolution strategy which may not be in their 
best interest and may not be the most effective strategy given the location and the type of entities 
covered. This leads the Author to argue that the choice of an SPOE may rather be the preferred 
option of the relevant US Agencies, leading to a phenomenon of “regulatees’ capture”. The paper 
also shows how in case of insolvency of a US based G-SIB with entities located in the EU tensions 
may arise with the EU authorities, which may prompt them to ring fence assets or to provide 
financial support to subsidiaries of US banks. This is mainly because of the uncertainty driven by: the 
existence of two types of resolution plans in the US; by the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of pre-
positioned loss absorbing capital at group level which may not overcome the double leverage 
problem; by deficiency in US law to deal with the liquidation of G-SIBs under an SPOE; and by the use 
of different insolvency procedures and policies in the US and the EU which may afford different 
degrees of protection to bank stakeholders. 
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1. Bank resolution and living wills in the US and the EU: same principles, different practices.  
Ex ante planning for resolution in banking marks the shift from taxpayers bail-out to the imposition 
of losses on shareholders and creditors, and it is a first step towards decreasing complexity in large 
financial institutions. The need to introduce recovery and resolution plans, also known as living wills, 
follows a move advocated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS)1. In 2011, the FSB included “Recovery and Resolution Planning” among 
the Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes2. 
Today, living wills are covered under both EU and US law.  Therefore, global systemically important 
banks (G-SIBs) incorporated in those countries have (or should have by now) drafted such plans3.   
The main body of law that governs living wills in the EU includes the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD)4 and the SRM Regulation5, both issued in 2014. The US legislator has centred its 
attention mainly on resolution planning, with provisions included in the Dodd Frank Act (and its 
implementing Regulations)6, in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rules7.  
Soft law standards issued by the FSB on resolution planning aim at aligning the relevant policies at 
international level, given that the failure of a G-SIB may inevitably involve different jurisdictions8. 
However, the analysis included in this paper discusses existing clashes between EU and US policies, 
even though their actual extent is difficult to assess due to the lack of a publicly available section9 of 
those plans in Europe10.  
                                                          
1 BCBS (2010), Report and Recommendations of the Cross Border Bank Resolution Group, available at 
www.bis.org 
2 See FSB (2011), Key attributes for effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, Key Attribute 11, 
available at www.financialstabilityboard.org  
3 The introduction of recovery and resolution planning is seen as a “good illustration of forward-looking risk 
based supervision from both a macro prudential and a micro-prudential perspective” and as a supplement of 
“risk-based supervision in a number of ways”. See Dalvinder Singh, “Recovery and Resolution Planning: 
Reconfiguring Financial Regulation and Supervision”, in Jens-Hinrich Binder and Dalvinder Singh (eds), Bank 
resolution. The European regime (OUP 2016), at 1.52 and 1.54. 
4 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institution and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council in OJ 2014 L 173/90. 
5 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2015 establishing 
uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in 
the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010, in OJ 2014 L 225/1. 
6 12 CFR Part 243 and 12 CFR Part 381 (discussed in the next sections as Regulation QQ). 
7 These will be covered in details in the next sections. 
8 A lower degree of harmonisation at international level can be observed on bank insolvency laws instead.  
9Only after taking resolution action against Banco Popular, the SRB made public a non-confidential version of 
the group resolution plan. See Banco Popular, Group Resolution Plan, 2016, (Security Classification: SRB 
GREEN), available here https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/resolution_plan_2016.pdf 
10 At the time of writing, Europe appears to lag behind resolution preparedness whereas greater progress has 
been made in the area of recovery planning, mostly due to the work of the European Banking Authority. This 
was also noted in a report by the European Court of Auditors, which acknowledged the area of resolution 
plans being “still very much a work in progress”. See ECA, Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging 





For instance, recent examples of failure or near failure of banks have highlighted how EU authorities 
opted for resolution tools which had a limited impact on subordinated bondholders11. Based on the 
findings of this paper, the social and political need to protect this category may not have been 
factored in by the US G-SIBs resolution plans. In principle, US requirements on Loss Absorbing Debt12 
prescribe that eligible instruments have to be unsecured and with medium term maturity but there 
are no rules on their subordination. However, the reliance placed by the plans on available liquidity 
at the onset of the crisis, which will be used to recapitalise local and foreign subsidiaries, is the key 
element to dissuade foreign authorities from ring fencing assets. To the extent to which a 
considerable amount of capital will be needed, banks are likely to use both unsubordinated and 
subordinated debt. So, EU based retail bondholders of US G-SIBs are at risk of suffering losses too. .  
It should also be noted how the threshold for taking supervisory action in relation to a bank in 
financial strain is not perfectly harmonised either. In the EU, art 32 (4) of the BRRD gives alternative 
options for considering an institution as failing or likely to fail (the so called FOLF test)13. There are 
few cases where the evaluation seems to differ14. In the EU one case considers the institution 
infringing, or likely to be infringing, the requirement for continuing authorisation in a way that would 
                                                          
https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=44424. However, in the 2017 work programme of 
the Single Resolution Board priority is given to the following areas, among the others: the operationalisation of 
resolution strategies; the execution of bail –in; the identification of obstacles to resolvability; MREL analysis; 
the continued development and work of the Single Resolution Fund. The programme also includes a section on 
“Benchmarking resolution plan”, where the Board expresses its intention to focus on benchmarking tools, 
harmonisation and dissemination of best practices identified in the assessed resolution plans. See SRB (2017), 
Work Programme for 2017, available here 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb_2016.5419_work_programme_2017_web.pdf. The Single 
Resolution Mechanism has also published a high level document on “Introduction to Resolution Planning” 
where the resolution planning phase is detailed as follows: at first there is a detailed overview of the bank 
which includes a description of bank’s business model, critical functions, core business lines, internal and 
external interdependencies etc. Then, a preferred resolution strategy is drawn by the SRB which implies an 
evaluation as to whether the bank can instead be wound down under normal insolvency proceedings. If that is 
not the case, and the bank needs to be resolved, the next phase would be the evaluation of possible 
impediments to resolvability. Following that, the Board will move to address those impediments and 
determine bank’s MREL. Finally, the bank is entitled to express comments in relation to the plan, which will 
form part of it. The chapters in which a plan should be divided into are: Strategic Business Analysis; Preferred 
Resolution Strategy; Financial and Operational Continuity in Resolution; Information and Communication Plan; 
Conclusion of the Resolvability Assessment; Opinion of the Bank in relation to the Resolution Plan. See SRM, 
Introduction to Resolution Planning, September 2016, available at 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/intro_resplanning.pdf.pdf 
11 See mainly the cases of Banco Popular, acquired by Santander and of Veneto Banca, sold to Banca Intesa. In 
both cases, the banks tried to raise liquidity in capital markets, but the amounts successfully raised did not 
prove sufficient in the medium term.  
12 12 CFR Part 252 (Regulation YY; Docket no 1438; RIN 7100-AD-86) Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank 
Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organisations 
13 On the FOLF Test, see also EBA, Guidelines on the interpretation of the different circumstances when an 
institution shall be considered as failing or likely to fail under Article 32(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU, 
EBA/GL/2015/07, 26 May 2015, available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1085517/EBA-GL-
2015-07+GL+on+failing+or+likely+to+fail.pdf/02539533-27ed-4467-b442-7d2fa6fcb3d3 
14 The terminology is different too. While EU law uses the “failing or likely to fail” test, US law mentions the 




justify the withdrawal of the authorisation, including but not limited to those cases where it “has 
incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds”15. In 
the US instead, Title II of the Dodd Frank Act allows for possible supervisory action – among the 
others- if a case is, or will soon be, starting under Ch 11, (with no equivalent requirement included 
under EU Law) and if “the financial company has incurred, or is likely to incur, losses that will deplete 
all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable prospect for the company to avoid 
such depletion”16. Taking the requirements for authorisation as a benchmark (EU) seems to be 
broader than capital depletion (US). It is unclear whether under US law the relevant conditions need 
to be met cumulatively or alternatively. EU law instead clearly states that the circumstances can be 
“one or more”17.  
 
The duty to consult trade unions and employees representatives throughout the recovery and 
resolution process embedded in the BRRD18 also betrays a greater attention in Europe to the social 
repercussions of banks’ failure than what is formalised under US law. A provision of a similar ethos is 
included in the Dodd-Frank Act only in case of intervention of the Orderly Liquidation Authority. In 
this case, the FDIC and the FED have to describe how the default of a large financial institution would 
effect “economic conditions or financial stability for low income, minority or underserved 
communities”19  
In terms of recovery, the work of the European Banking Authority has showed a considerable degree 
of sophistication in the design of such plans. However, the decision to precautionary recapitalise 
institutions with funding problems, as it happened with Monte dei Paschi di Siena in early 2017, may 
hint at possible difficulties in the implementation of recovery plans, but also at how EU authorities 
may tend to postpone the resolution phase20. In the US, supervisory authorities seemingly rely more 
on the existence of robust internal governance mechanism as a first line of defence to implement 
possible recovery actions rather than on the drafting of such plans, as the Authorities focus is on 
resolution preparedness21. 
 A further clash may have wider repercussions in case of cross border banking failure Here,  the EU 
and the US - home to the majority of G-SIBs - have adopted different policies. While US law favours 
liquidation over resolution, European authorities would only use national insolvency procedures 
whenever public interest22 is not at stake. Yet given that the insolvency of a G-SIB located in the 
euro-area may likely pose concerns to public interest, one can argue that such an entity would be 
                                                          
15 See art 32 (4) (a) BRRD 
16 See Sec 203 (4)(A) and (B) Dodd Frank Act 
17 See Art 32 (4) BRRD 
18 See par 35 of the BRRD and par 48 of the SRM Regulation.  
19 See Sec 203 (a)(2)(C) Dodd frank Act.  
20 See Olivares-Caminal R and Russo C (2017), Precautionary recapitalisation: time for a review?, in – depth 
analysis for the European Parliament, available here 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/602092/IPOL_IDA(2017)602092_EN.pdf 
21 Recovery plans are prescribed under US law too. However, the amount of guidance and transparency 
around them is considerably lower. See FED, Consolidated Recovery Planning for Certain Large Domestic Bank 
Holding Companies, SR 14-8, September 25, 2014, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1408.htm 
22 While there is no specific definition of public interest, consideration is given to the provision of critical 
functions, the need to protect depositors, public and clients funds and assets, as well as the existence of a 
threat to financial stability.  These are the resolution objectives set out by the BRRD and the SRM Regulation.  
5 
 
resolved23. As mentioned, the default option for US G-SIBs is the insolvency procedure regulated by 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code. This difference may explode abruptly in the case of 
insolvency of a local G-SIB with considerable amount of cross border activities and may lead to 
uncoordinated and protective actions by the relevant national authorities. This in turn may lead to 
the loss of franchise value for the group to the actual detriment of EU (and other foreign based) 
entities. The use (or the expectation by EU authorities) of liquidation proceedings under Title II of 
the Dodd Frank Act may possibly mitigate this tension, because it is a regulatory led procedure (with 
however objectives not necessarily coincident with those of EU authorities).  
Another element may increase cross border tensions in case of insolvency of a US G-SIB. This relates 
to the existence of two different plans that these SIBs have to draw up, one disciplined by the Dodd 
Frank Act (DFA plan) and the other by a rule issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(CIDI plan). As explained in this paper, the two plans differ in scope and subject matter, with DFA 
plans focused on the group as a whole and CIDI plans covering only the deposit taking entities and 
their subsidiaries. Resolution strategies differ too and have a different impact on creditors, 
shareholders and financial contracts. However, the deposit taking institutions of a group are also 
included in the DFA plan, so it is left to the discretion of US resolution authorities to decide which 
plan to activate in case of insolvency of the deposit institution. The reason why discretion may 
increase tensions is because the decision will most likely be taken upon the occurrence of a stress, 
and because many of the entities covered by both plans are in fact located in Europe. The 
uncertainty over which plan will be triggered, coupled with the uncertainty over the degree of 
protection that foreign depositors and other creditors face, may give European resolution 
authorities incentives to take protective actions. 
In September 2017 the SRB and the FDIC signed a Cooperation Arrangement (CA) where they intend 
to consult each other regularly on cooperation and exchange of information in the area of 
resolution24. The CA establishes some common principles regarding resolution of firms with cross 
                                                          
23 It is also worth mentioning how, even where the public interest test was not met at SRB level – as with the 
insolvency of Veneto Banca in Italy-, a different conclusion could still be reached at national level. In the 
Veneto Banca case, the SRB decided that the bank was failing or likely to fail, yet as there was no public 
interest at stake, the bank was resolved under the applicable Italian insolvency law. However, the Italian 
government decided that there was in fact a public interest to protect the regional economy and therefore 
provided financial and other support to the acquiring bank to favour the purchase. See D.L. 25 Giugno 2017, n 
99. Disposizioni Urgenti per la Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa di Banca Popolare di Vicenza s.p.a.e di 
Veneto Banca s.p.a., in G.U. n 146 of 25.6.17, converted into Law on 08.08.2017 (Legge 31 Luglio 2017 n 121, 
in G.U n 184 of 08.08.17). This decision seems to be consistent with an earlier opinion of the SRB, in 2015, 
which deemed the liquidation of the group under national insolvency proceedings as not credible due to the 
“potential adverse impact of liquidation of the group on market confidence and the risk of contagion to tother 
credit institutions”. See SRB, Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of 
Veneto Banca S.p.A. (the “Institution”), with the Legal Entity Identifier 549300W9STRUCJ2DLU64, addressed to 
Banca d’Italia in its capacity as National Resolution Authority, (SRB/EES/2017/11), 23 June 2017, available here 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb-ees-2017-11_non-confidential.pdf, at par (19). 
24 See FDIC-SRB, Cooperation Arrangement Concerning the Resolution of Insured Depository Institutions and 
Certain Other Financial Companies with Cross Border Operations in the United States and the European 
Banking Union, 27 September 2017, available here https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/fdic-srb_rca_-
_final_-_september_20_2017_.pdf. The European Banking Authority has entered into a similar cooperation 
agreement with different US agencies in charge of bank resolution. See Framework Cooperation Arrangement 
between the European Banking Authority and U.S Authorities available here 
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border operation –such as the need to enter into ex ante preparation, to ensure flexibility in the 
design of arrangements and tools in the field of cross border cooperation. “Where possible and 
appropriate”25 ex post and ex ante resolution action should be consistent and “resolution options (…) 
consistent with (authorities) respective resolution objectives”26. In the specific field of resolution 
planning, authorities intend to provide reciprocal assistance and information related to firms 
business, legal, organisational and operational requirements27. Whereas such agreement certainly 
represents a step forward in the field of cross border cooperation, it does not specifically address 
the above clashes, nor does it establish a principle of universal recognition of foreign-based firm’s 
resolution strategy. 
This research also highlights how in the US resolution options are genuinely market-oriented, with a 
limited role played by resolution authorities. In Europe market dynamics may be distorted by more 
intrusive forms of public intervention via state aid, precautionary recapitalisation, ex ante bail in 
aimed at reorganising the business,  existence of a resolution fund, and other public measures to 
sustain the carve out of legacy assets. It should also be noted that in Europe it is the resolution 
authority that draws up the plan in collaboration with the firm. In the US, under Title I of Dodd Frank 
the onus falls on the firm, with the authorities approving it or asking to address identified 
deficiencies and shortcomings. 
2. Methodology and main findings 
This paper investigates the 2015,2016 and 2017 resolution plans of all the US banks included in the 
FSB list of the thirty global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)28 with a view to assess US G-SIBs 
degree of resolvability. It also critically analyses the implication of the chosen resolution strategies at 
national and international level. 
Despite existing problems, the research   exposes the beneficial effect that the drafting of living wills 
had on groups’ operational, financial, legal, and organisational structure. In this sense, ex ante 
resolution planning achieved one of its primary aims. Given the consideration placed by 
policymakers upon groups organisation for resolvability and resolution purposes, the analysis 
included in this paper covers governance mechanisms; legal entity rationalisation; and group 
interconnections and interdependencies in great depth.  
At least in the US, requiring large and complex financial institutions to draw up resolution plans 
allows also taxpayers to know in detail how banks operate and how they are structured. This shared 
knowledge and understanding is only made possible by the existence of a public section of these 
plans which is mandated by US law. Even if the content of the public section must represent only a 
tiny fraction of the overall plan, it is still an invaluable treasure trove for all stakeholders and a bow 
to transparency and to (private) accountability. This in turns helps in the reduction of agency costs as 
it reduces information asymmetries. So far, European authorities seem to value confidentiality over 
                                                          
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1762986/Framework+Agreement+-+EBA-US+agencies+-
+September+2017.pdf 
25 FDIC-SRB, Cooperation arrangement, (ft 24), par 14. 
26 Ibidem.  
27 FDIC-SRB, Cooperation arrangement, (ft 24), par 21. 
28 Namely: JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, State Street Bank, Wells 
Fargo, Bank of America Corporation, and Bank of New York Mellon.  
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transparency given that a similar requirement is not included in European legislation29 nor is there 
any sign that supervisors are heading in that direction30. Yet, having a public section of a resolution 
plan does not seem to make banks more vulnerable. Rather, it may make them more accountable to 
the public as a whole. 
What allows the interpreter to make an informed assessment of the plans is also the existence of 
publicly available feedback letters provided by the US Agencies in charge of approving them, namely 
the Federal Reserve (FED) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (the Agencies). In 
their latest guidance, the Agencies have also publicly specified the criteria used to assess banks and 
what is expected under each set. These policies in turn improve their own transparency and degree 
of accountability as it is now possible to observe –albeit only part of –Agencies actions to improve 
SIBs resolvability.   
US institutions have now been required to indicate how the current version of the plan has improved 
compared to the previous one. This paper evaluates the 2015, 2016, and 2017 versions of the plan 
mandated by the Dodd Frank Act against the feedback provided by the Agencies.  
From a crisis management perspective, the paper confirms that the decision to leave bank 
insolvency to lex generalis, as Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code can be considered, may give 
rise to a wealth of issues that will most likely require regulatory intervention to avoid a disorderly 
failure. This strengthens the finding of the suitability of a lex specialis for the management of bank 
insolvency, as correctly opted for in Europe. The plans have also surprisingly shown uniform and 
standardised actions to contain the crisis and to transition to the wind up/liquidation stage.  
Whereas the solutions considered may work smoothly for idiosyncratic crises, in case of a systemic 
event or one that involves different market sectors, the strategies adopted by the banks may not 
prove to be feasible because the all rely on availability of liquidity on third parties to support sales.  
In turn, this exposes a critical issue in bank insolvency, namely the problem of funding in the 
resolution phase. This is addressed unsatisfactorily by European legislation and Authorities too. In 
the UK instead, the PRA has an established facility to provide banks with liquidity to support the 
resolution strategy31. 
From a public policy perspective, the critical analysis of the plans suggests two striking conclusions. 
The first relates to the existence of a “regulatees capture” phenomenon whereby firms have 
preferred a resolution strategy which seems to be chiefly in the regulators’ best interest.  The 
second is that all resolution options consider the management of banks’ failure as being self-
contained: it will be administered by US authorities only. The extent to which this is realistic remains 
unclear as it hinges upon the existence of effective cooperation mechanisms between authorities 
                                                          
29 Par 44 of the SRM Regulation subjects resolution plans to the “requirements of professional secrecy” laid 
down in the Regulation due to “the sensitivity of information contained in them”. Par 116 too insists on the 
need to keep confidential any information related to resolution plans.  
30 However, in the UK the Bank of England issued in May 2017 a document detailing the amount of MREL that 
certain SIB operating in the UK must hold to be prepared for resolution. See Bank of England (2017), Minimum 
requirements for eligible liabilities and own funds, available here 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/role/risk_reduction/srr/mrel.aspx 
31 See PRA, The Bank of England’s approach to resolution, October 2017, available here 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability/resolution/boes-approach-to-
resolution.pdf?la=en&hash=8213BE00D67C4CADB948D51FEBD164E136A70BE6,  at p 22 
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located in different countries, which are notoriously not always successful. The US Agencies in 
charge will have to exercise all their persuasive powers to reassure third country Authorities that the 
universal insolvency procedure they have approved is not going to have negative repercussions on 
their local creditors, investors and the economy. Third country Authorities need also to be satisfied 
that the amount of liquidity prepositioned to each foreign subsidiary is enough to withstand the 
crisis and that the contractual mechanisms which impose further downstream of capital will be 
honoured. In Europe, the proposed requirement to set up an intermediate holding company for 
foreign large financial institutions may make this exercise more complex as in fact expresses a 
regulatory preference for multiple points of entry in cross border resolution.  
The paper is organised as follows: Part I broadly describes the US legal regime on resolution 
planning, and compares and contrast scope and content of the two types of plans financial 
institutions are required to draw up. In Part II, the analysis is centred on the beneficial effects that 
the introduction of resolution plans had on G-SIBs organisational structure. Specific attention is paid 
to governance mechanisms; legal entity rationalisation; and group interconnections and 
interdependencies. The assessment is conducted taking into account the feedback letters that the 
FED and the FDIC have provided to these banks. Part III moves to investigate the Single Point of Entry 
as the resolution option included in the DFA plans and critically analyses its weaknesses. Part IV 
concludes.  
Part I 
1.1 The US legal framework  
The legal framework pertaining to recovery and resolution planning in the US includes both primary 
and secondary sources. Title I of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(the Dodd-Frank Act)32 grants the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the FSOC)33 powers to make 
recommendations to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the resolution plans 
                                                          
32 As it is well known, the Dodd Frank Act is an incredibly complex piece of legislation which relies heavily on 
the implementing measures issued by relevant agencies. This piecemeal approach resulted in a long and  
articulated maze of rules and regulations that may be seen as lacking coherence. The Act includes roughly 
1300 sections, divided into 16 titles. It is available here 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/hr4173_enrolledbill.pdf. A list of all Dodd-
Frank final rules and orders is available at http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-
FrankFinalRules/index.htm. For an academic analysis of the Act, see Coffee, John C. (2011), Systemic risk after 
Dodd-frank: contingent capital and the need for regulatory strategies beyond oversight, Columbia Law Review, 
vol. 111, no. 4, pp. 795–847. www.jstor.org/stable/41305139; Wan, Joshua S. (2016), Systemically important 
asset managers: perspectives on Dodd-frank's systemic designation mechanism,  Columbia Law Review, vol. 
116, no. 3, pp. 805–841. www.jstor.org/stable/43783395. Fischer, F. (2015), Dodd-Frank's failure to address 
CFTC oversight of self-regulatory organization rulemaking, Columbia Law Review, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 69–125. 
www.jstor.org/stable/43153767; Hansberry, Heidi l. (2012), In spite of its good intentions, the Dodd—Frank 
act has created an FCPA monster,  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 195–226. 
www.jstor.org/stable/23145789, Richardson, M (2012),  Regulating Wall Street: the Dodd Frank Act, in 
Economic Perspectives, vol 36, issue 3, p 85-97; Stunda R (2016)., The impact of Dodd-Frank on the economy 
and financial institutions five years later, Journal of business & accounting,  vol9(1):167-177; Prasch R (2012), 
The Dodd Frank Act: financial reform of business as usual? , at Journal of Economic Issues, vol 46, issue 2, p 
549-556.  
33 The FSOC was established by the Dodd-Frank Act (Title I, sub (A), Sec 111) to identify risks to financial 




of certain banks and non-bank financial holding companies34. Most importantly, sec 165 (d) requires 
bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, and nonbank financial 
companies designated by the FSOC as systemically important (and as such supervised by the Federal 
Reserve) to periodically submit resolution plans to the FED and the  FDIC35. The rule applies also to 
foreign bank holding companies with US financial operations above a certain threshold36. 
Each plan must be credible and describe the company's strategy for rapid and orderly resolution 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the event of material financial distress or failure of the 
company37.  
At their minimum, these plans must include three different types of information: 1) information 
regarding the way and the extent to which a deposit taking institution is insulated from risks arising 
from the activities of the non-bank subsidiary of the parent institution; 2) a full description of 
ownership structure including assets, liabilities, and contractual obligations; and 3) identification of 
the cross-guarantees tied to different securities, of major counterparties, and a process for 
determining to whom the collateral of the company is pledged38.  Also, the institution should include 
any other information requested by the FED and the FDIC39, which are included in secondary FED 
and FDIC measures (joint measures). Should the plan not be credible, or should it not facilitate an 
orderly resolution under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the FED and the FDIC can reject it 
and ask for a resubmission40. Failing the plan still to be credible, the Agencies can impose more 
stringent capital, leverage or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on growth, activities and 
operations of the company and its subsidiaries until a new plan is being submitted, as happened to 
Wells Fargo in 201641.    
                                                          
34 See Sec 112 (2) (I); 115 (b) (1) (D) and (d) (1) Dodd Frank Act. 
35 The FDIC is the US federal agency in charge of deposit insurance. As of 30 September 2011, the FDIC insured 
approx. 6.78 trillions of deposits held in more than 7445 depository institutions. See FDIC, 12 CFR Part 360 RIN 
3064-AD59 (s.c. IDI Rule), at p 2. 
36 FED, Board’s Regulation QQ (12 CFR 243) on “Resolution Plans” available here www.ecfr.gov/cgi-
bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=745f36bbc567b55fbe7525379a8bb3d6&r=PART&n=12y4.0.1.1.13 Sec 243.2 (f) (3). 
Regulation QQ, issued in accordance to sec 165 (d) (8) of the Dodd-Frank act, includes among those 
institutions required to submit a resolution plan: “Any foreign bank or company that is a bank holding 
company or is treated as a bank holding company under section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978 
(12 U.S.C. 3106(a)), and that has $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets, as determined based on the 
foreign bank's or company's most recent annual or, as applicable, the average of the four most recent 
quarterly Capital and Asset Reports for Foreign Banking organizations as reported on the Federal Reserve's 
Form FR Y-7Q (“FR Y-7Q”)”. In the literature, see: Lapres D A (2011), The implications of the financial reform 
act for foreign banks, financial institutions and financial regulators, in IBJL 531; White GH (2010), The global 
reach of the Dodd-Frank Act,  10 JIBFL 579. 
37 See www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
38 See sec 165(d) (1) Dodd - Frank Act 
39 See sec 165 (d)(1) Dodd – Frank Act 
40 See sec 165 (4) and (5) (A) Dodd – Frank Act. In this case, the FED however shall consult with each member 
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) that primarily supervised an involved entity, see Regulation 
QQ, (ft 36), 243.7 (a), whereas it only may consult with foreign supervisory authorities or any other federal or 
State supervisor (Regulation QQ 243.7 (b)). 
41 In their assessment of the 2015 plans, the Agencies concluded that the bank had not successfully addressed 
two of the three deficiencies (related to “legal entity rationalisation” and “shared services”) and decided to 
impose growth restrictions. Wells Fargo has been prohibited from establishing international bank entities or 
acquiring any non-bank subsidiaries until the Agencies are satisfied that the deficiencies have been successfully 
10 
 
In 2011 the FED issued the main regulation on resolution, Regulation QQ42, which implements the 
Dodd Frank provisions. Regulation QQ contains the detailed list of items that need to be included in 
the plan. These are divided into different categories: strategic analysis, corporate governance 
relating to resolution planning; company organisational structure and related information; 
information system management; interconnections and interdependencies; supervisory and 
regulatory information; and reference to relevant information from previous plans.   
In 2012, the FED issued a supervisory letter regarding a consolidated supervision framework for large 
financial institutions43, followed in 2013 by joint general guidance on resolution plans for both 
domestic and foreign based institutions (the 2013 Guidance)44. Further specifications on heightened 
supervisory expectation for recovery and resolution planning of the eight domestic bank holding 
company which may pose elevated risk to financial stability45 and a set of principles for recovery and 
resolution preparedness followed suit46. The  subsequent version of the Guidance (2017 Guidance47 
aims at assisting firms in developing their plans by indicating those areas “where additional detail 
should be provided and where certain capabilities or optionality should be developed to 
demonstrate that each firm has considered fully, and is able to mitigate, obstacles to the successful 
implementation of the preferred strategy”48. 
The 2017 Guidance considers the following as key vulnerabilities in resolution: capital, liquidity, 
governance mechanisms, operational, legal entity rationalisation and separability, and derivatives 
and trading activities.   
Banks should also comply with Regulation YY49 that requires, among the others, domestic holding 
companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more to hold enhanced levels of capital 
                                                          
addressed. Should they not be satisfied, they will impose further restrictions. Specifically they will “limit the 
size of the firm’s non-bank and broker dealer assets to levels in place on September 30, 2016”. See FDIC-FED 
Joint Press Release, Agencies announce determination on October resolution plan submissions of five 
systemically important domestic banking institutions, December 13, 2016, available here 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20161213a.htm 
42 Regulation QQ, (ft 36). 
43 See FED, Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions, SR 12-17/CA letter 12-14, 
available at www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1217.pdf  
44 FDIC-FED, Guidance for 2013 § 165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by Domestic Covered Companies 
that Submitted Initial Resolution Plans in 2012, available at 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/domesticguidance.pdf, and Guidance for 2013 §165(d) Annual Resolution 
Plan Submissions by Foreign-Based Covered Companies that Submitted Initial Resolution Plans in 2012, 
available at  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/joint_resolution_plans_foreign-
based_guidance_20130415.pdf 
45 FED, Heightened supervisory expectations for recovery and resolution preparedness for certain large bank 
holding companies- Supplemental Guidance on Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial 
Institutions (SR letter 12-17/CA letter 12-14),  SR 14-1, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR1401.htm 
46 Principles and practices for recovery and resolution preparedness, attachment to SR 14-1. These focus on: 
Collateral Management, Payment Clearing and Settlement Activities, Liquidity and Funding, Management 
Information Systems, and Shared and Outsourced Services.  
47 FDIC-FED, Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions By Domestic Covered Companies 
that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015, October 2016, available here 
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031b.pdf 
48 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 3. 
49 Regulation YY (ft 12).  
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and liquidity. It also imposes foreign based banking organisations with total consolidated assets of 
$50 billion or more to set up a US based intermediate holding company as an additional prudential 
standard and to facilitate their resolution50. 
The assessment of a plan is a joint endeavour of the FED and the FDIC, which divide their evaluations 
into deficiencies and shortcomings in order of severity. However, the decision making process and 
the weight carried by each agency is unclear. For instance, in the case of Goldman Sachs the FDIC 
found the resolution plan to be deficient, whereas the FED was of a different opinion. The final 
assessment shows that the main criticisms were downgraded to “shortcomings” with a footnote 
explaining that in FDIC’s opinion those were actually deficiencies.  
In addition to the plans mandated by the Dodd Frank Act (known as DFA Resolution Plans), the IDI 
rule51 requires systemically important insured deposit-taking institutions with 10 billion or more of 
asset, to include in their resolution plans provisions related to the resolution of the bank under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the FDI Act). These are known as CIDI resolution plans. Specifically, 
the CIDI plan will have to “enable the FDIC, as a receiver, to resolve the institution under sec 11 and 
13 of the FDI Act 12 U.S.C. 1821 and 1823” 52. The plan should be drafted taking into account FDIC 
three main goals in resolution: 1) ensuring access to deposits within one business day of the 
institution failure; 2) maximising the return on assets; and 3) minimise creditors’ losses53. A specific 
guidance is also attached to the rule54. 
1.2 The plans: DFA vs CIDI plans 
As mentioned above, based on the value of their consolidated assets foreign and domestic covered 
companies may have to draw two distinct resolution plans: one as disciplined by the Dodd Frank Act 
(DFA plan) and one as regulated by the IDI rule (CIDI plan).  
DFA and CIDI plans differ considerably in terms of scope and applicable law. DFA plans require banks 
to devise a possible resolution strategy compatible with Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code, 
which disciplines the reorganization or liquidation55 of a failed company. A DFA plan will cover the 
parent holding company and those subsidiaries and affiliates that are considered material to the 
business (called Material Legal Entities). A CIDI plan will only cover the group deposit taking 
institution(s) which fall under a certain threshold, and its branches and consolidated subsidiaries 
                                                          
50 As mentioned in the first paragraph and in the conclusions of this paper, a similar requirement for foreign 
banks is currently debated in Europe, as part of the proposed amendment to the Capital Requirements 
Directive and Regulation.  
51 See FDIC, 12 CFR Part 360 RIN 3064-AD59, s.c. IDI rule. Please note, an interim final rule was issued in 2011 
and was effective from 1 January 2012 to 1 April 2012 until superseded by the current version. The previous 
Interim Final Rule was the 76 FR 58 379 (September 21, 2011).  
52 In essence, the FDI Act disciplines all aspects of a possible FDIC receivership. The receivership is activated 
upon the insolvency of the bank. As of January 2012, 37 institutions are covered by the IDI rule, which 
cumulative hold approx. 4.14 trillion in insured deposits 
53 See IDI rule, (ft 51), at p 19 
54 FDIC, Guidance for Covered Insured Depository Institutions Resolution Plans Submissions, available here 
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2014/pr14109a.pdf  
55 Even if CH 11 is focused on reorganisation, a liquidation plan is also possible. For a detailed summary of the 




material to the business. This is the reason why identified Material Legal Entities (MLE)56 and core 
business lines of the same group may differ among plans57.  
In practice, under a DFA plan all but one of the eight banks have opted for a resolution strategy that 
puts only the parent holding company into Bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 1158. Upon filing 
for CH 11 the holding would transfer its assets and its shares of the MLEs to an intermediate holding 
company (IHC). The IHC will be run by a reorganisation trust acting in the interest of the bankruptcy 
estate. MLEs will either continue operating as going concern or be sold gradually, either entirely or 
by business lines. This is also one of the reasons why the Agencies insisted with banks to streamline 
core business lines and legal entities. 
Under CH 11, bank management will then have to file for emergency motions to allow for the 
transfers and for the execution of the trust agreement. In the DFA plans which are the subject of this 
research, those and all the other necessary paperwork, have been roughly already prepared to avoid 
unnecessary delay.  
Under a CIDI plan instead, banks will have to plan for an FDIC receivership as regulated by the FDI 
Act, sec 11 and 13. FDIC receivership may mean that the assets of the failing bank, the viable parts of 
the business, and deposits are transferred to a “bridge bank”, whereas the liabilities are liquidated 
under the FDIC insolvency procedure. A variant version would transfer asset and liabilities of core 
business lines (other than those liabilities directly connected to the institution failure) to the bridge 
bank which in turn will continue operate the lines of business59. Some plans also include a similar 
provision to what is included in DFA plans in terms of downstreaming of financial resources, in this 
                                                          
56 The IDI Rule defines Material Entity as “a company that is significant to the activities of a critical service or a 
core business lines”. Similarly, Regulation QQ defines it as “a subsidiary or foreign office of the covered 
company that is significant to the activities of a critical operation or core business line”. One submitter bank 
distilled the legal definition even further, identifying MLE as those that: “(a) contract with and manage key 
global client relationships in the local marketplace ("Client Facing" or "CF"), (b) are direct members or 
participants of Financial Market Utilities ("Membership Holder" or "MH"), (c) accept client deposits/provide a 
source of liquidity necessary to fund Critical Operations and settlement obligations ("Liquidity Provider" or 
"LP") and (d) are instrumental in managing and moving liquidity to and FMUs/paying agents, and/or provide 
other key operational infrastructure ("Service Infrastructure" or "SI"). In addition, State Street assessed an 
entity’s role within the delivery of its Critical Operations, focusing on the levels of dedicated personnel, 
whether work could be transferred to other designated Material Entities or where specific contracts with 
FMUs are held” See State Street, Resolution Plan, 2015, p 29 available 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
57 The different identification of core business lines of the covered companies is justified also by the applicable 
definitions. The IDI rule defines them as “those business lines of the CIDI, including associated operations, 
services, functions and support that in the view of the CIDI upon failure would result in a material loss of 
revenue, profit or franchise value”, IDI Rule, (ft 51), sec 360.10 (b). Sec 243.2 (d) of Regulation QQ defines 
them as “those business lines of the covered company including associated operations, services, functions and 
support that in the view of the covered company upon failure would result in a material loss of revenue, profit 
or franchise value”. Basically, in the CIDI plans the focus is on the deposit taking institution, whereas in the DFA 
plans the focus is on the non-bank financial company or the domestic or foreign bank holding company. So for 
instance, for DFA purposes one company identified its core business lines as: investment banking, financial 
advisory, underwriting, institutional client services, fixed income, currency and commodities, client execution, 
and equities. For CIDI purposes instead the same company identified the following core business lines: deposit 
taking, private bank lending, corporate lending, and interest rate derivatives product. A noticeable difference 
can be found in the definitions of critical operations instead, which in the IDI rule are called critical services. 
58 This is an example of a Single Point of Entry strategy, as will be discussed extensively in Part IV of this paper.  
59 This is the case of State Street Bank CIDI plan.  
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case from the parent to the ailing bank before it enters receivership. The downstreaming may take 
the form of debt forgiveness or capital injections. The great majority of the analysed CIDI plans 
devised the following strategies: a “multiple acquirer strategy”, a “recapitalisation/IPO strategy” and 
a “liquidation strategy”60 with banks regulating differently the scope of the bridge bank61. Under a 
“Multiple Acquirer strategy” the core business lines transferred to the bridge bank would be sold to 
third purchasers62. The “recapitalisation /IPO strategy” includes the creation of a third company to 
which transfer the bridge bank assets and whose shares are then sold on to the market via an IPO. 
This may require the transfer of funding to the bridge bank if needed, which can be recovered with 
the proceeds of sale. The “liquidation strategy” aims at orderly liquidating the bridge bank should 
none of the alternatives be successful. Some plans consider a wind down strategy too in the latter 
case.  
As required by the FDIC, the strategies have to be designed on the basis of the bank “current 
structure and operating model” and take into account “historical facts and conditions”63. These 
should also assume that the covered institution is in fact insolvent, as “the financial condition of the 
CIDI, at the point of appointment of the FDIC as a receiver, should reflect an insolvency –based 
ground for receivership under the FDI Act”64. Inevitably, the failing bank may require the transfer of 
funds from the FDIC or the Deposit Insurance Fund.  
                                                          
60 The Multiple Acquirer Strategy and the Liquidation Strategy are actually being requested by the FDIC. The 
FDIC also details certain expectations as to the content of the strategies. See FDIC, Guidance (ft. 57).  
61 Even though some plans are more articulated than others. For instance Goldman Sachs Bank (GSB) plan is 
extremely detailed. It considers both a multiple acquirer strategy and a liquidation strategy and it specifically 
includes the transfer of the derivatives portfolio of the covered institution to the bridge bank.  Both strategies 
will terminate with the winding down of the bridge bank. Under the Multiple Acquirer Strategy GSB loans 
would be sold through the disposal of entire portfolios to a small number of targeted investors and “in some 
cases, purchasers may also assume some of the bridge bank’s insured term deposits in order to finance the 
loans”. As for the derivatives portfolio, part of it will reach maturity whereas the remaining positions would be 
closed either via novation, negotiated termination or portfolio sale. Overnight deposits are expected to be 
withdrawn over several weeks, whereas term deposit with a remaining tenure of more than one year “may 
either be transferred to other banks in conjunction with the sale of certain loan portfolios, or they may be 
transferred without a corresponding asset sale, albeit at a higher premium. The remainder is repaid upon 
reaching contractual maturity”. Under the liquidation strategy the bridge bank is wound down as follows: 
“Loans: In comparison with the Multiple Acquirer Strategy, the Liquidation Strategy calls for the bridge bank’s 
loans to be sold in a more piecemeal fashion, to a wider range of investors over a longer period of time. 
Derivatives: The exit strategy for the bridge bank’s derivatives positions is the same under the Liquidation 
Strategy as under the Multiple Acquirer Strategy. Deposits: All of the bridge bank’s overnight deposits are 
assumed to be withdrawn by clients over several weeks, and its term deposits are repaid upon reaching 
contractual maturity.” See Goldman Sachs Bank US, Resolution Plan, Public Filing, September 1, 2015, available 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
62 For instance, State Street bank envisages a great interest from global, national or regional financial 
institutions, private equity or other buyers of financial assets. Ideally Global Custody should be preserved “as 
an integrated business in a sale transaction, in order to minimize disruption to its clients and to maximize the 
value of the basket of interconnected and synergistic services that State Street offers today; Material Entities 
that are sufficiently self-sustaining and able to continue operations in the ordinary course of business would 
not need to be placed into resolution proceedings”. See CIDI Resolution plan for State Street Bank and Trust 
Company, Section 1: Public Section, September 1, 2015, at p 16, available at 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
63 As included in FDIC, Guidance (ft 57), p 3. 
64 Ibidem, p 2 
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 DFA and CIDI plans differ also in terms of objectives and protected interests. The IDI rule identifies 
the protected interests as those of the depositors to receive prompt access to their deposits (one 
business day or two if the failure occurs on a day other than a Friday); the maximisation of the net 
present value return from the sale or asset disposition; and the minimisation of the amount of losses 
suffered by creditors. The IDI rule also requires the strategy to be the least costly alternative to the 
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)65. By contrast, Regulation QQ requires an orderly and rapid resolution 
for the purpose of mitigating the risk that the failure of the covered company could have adverse 
effects on financial stability in the United States66.  
Even though they do not appear to be mutually exclusive, those competing aims justify different 
resolution strategies. However, the actual resolution strategy employed during a crisis may come at 
a cost for the relevant stakeholders and the same covered company. As many banks have noted, 
business reorganization under a DFA plan allows the relevant MLEs to survive and to be wound 
down over time in an orderly manner. This may preserve the inherent value of the entities and 
possibly realise profits for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. A CIDI resolution may instead turn 
into a fire sale of assets, may be lengthier, may possibly entail a disorderly close out of certain 
derivative and other hedging contracts, may cause a great administrative burden on the FDIC and 
may not be in the best interest of the creditors of the company. From the same perspective of the 
FDIC, a DFA strategy by definition would require no transfer of funds from the deposit insurer, which 
would make it the least costly option. 
One may argue however that the resolution toolkit at FDIC disposal (“deposit payoff, insured deposit 
transfers, payment and assumption agreements, whole bank transactions and open bank 
assistance”67) has been well tested over time as the FDIC has specific experience in handling bank 
failures which spans several decades. Those tools can be directly managed by the FDIC or  see the 
involvement of private parties. The CH 11 restructuring procedure instead is mainly a judicial 
administered procedure not frequently tested against the insolvency of a large and complex financial 
institution, having been used almost exclusively for the Lehman Brothers insolvency, absent viable 
alternatives at the time. Also, these G-SIBs have a strong presence in foreign jurisdictions therefore 
their restructuring would inevitably need coordination with foreign supervisors, even if the living will 
considers otherwise. Judges may find it difficult to achieve an optimal level of coordination. This 
issue seems to be less poignant in Europe where resolution and liquidation procedures are mostly 
handled by supervisory agencies.  
This uncertainty over the most effective procedure may not be beneficial for foreign resolution 
authorities either. Despite the said distinctions in applicability, there are elements of coincidence 
                                                          
65 One of the respondents to the FDIC consultation document related to the IDI rule highlighted the distortions 
that this provision may ingenerate. The respondent noted that it is the FDIC to be best suited to evaluate the 
cost of the resolution strategy, which can be done only after its execution; and that giving covered companies 
the power to choose the “least costly” strategy would dissuade them from considering other resolution 
strategies. See IDI Rule (ft. 51) p. 9-10. 
66 See Regulation QQ (ft 36), Sec 243.2 (o). 
67 See, Bennett R. L. and Unal H. (2014), Understanding the components of bank failure resolution costs, FDIC-
CFR working paper, p. 4, available here fdic.gov/cfr. On a related matter, the OECD recently published a report 
on the estimated costs that could be incurred by bank creditors and taxpayers in case of a bank who has or is 
about to fail. See Blix Grimaldi M. et al. (2016), Estimating the size and incidence of bank resolution costs for 
selected banks in OECD Countries, OECD Journal: Financial Markets Trend, 1.  
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among the two plans. Entities covered in the CIDI plan are also included in the DFA plan. The 
problem is that entities in the CIDI plan too are located abroad and foreign resolution authorities 
may have incentives to ring fence them because if a deposit taking entity becomes insolvent, the 
choice of resolution strategy (DFA vs CIDI) is left to US Agencies’ discretion. For instance, covered 
CIDI entities of BNY Mellon are in Germany (n. 3), India (n 1), Belgium (n 2) and UK (one only). In the 
case of Citi, CIDI firms are in the UK (n. 2), Ireland (n. 2), Japan (n. 2), Singapore (n. 2), Hong Kong (n. 
3), Bahamas, Philippine, Germany, Costa Rica, and India. The multiple acquirer strategy for the 
banking entities require the transfer of all assets and liabilities to a US bridge bank. The size of those 
subsidiaries may also be large. For instance, the total assets of Citi main banking company in London 
(CBNA London) were 262.6 billion and total liabilities 262.6 billion as of end 2014. Furthermore, 
some CIDI plans consider two possible strategies, usually a multiple acquirer and a liquidation 
strategy. This would add an extra layer of uncertainty as the actual choice will be left to the FDIC at 
the point of crisis.  
It should finally be mentioned here that a CH 11 procedure may be interrupted by a decision of the 
Secretary of the Treasury (taken in agreement with the US President) to resort to Title II of the Dodd 
Frank Act instead68. This grants the FDIC with the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) to deal with 
those failures which may impact financial stability. While OLA is meant to be a “backup resolution 
authority”69 for the default of systemically important institutions that causes severe economic 
distress, the rationale behind its use is a threat to financial stability, as with DFA plans. Yet OLA 
activities are modelled upon traditional FDIC receivership procedures70. Even though one possible 
strategy may well be the resolution of the parent holding company followed by recapitalisation of a 
                                                          
68 Sec 208 (a) Dodd Frank Act states that “Effective as of the date of the appointment of the Corporation as 
receiver for the covered financial company under section 202 (…) any case or proceeding commenced with 
respect to the covered financial company under the Bankruptcy Code or the Securities Investor Protection Act 
of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78 aaa et seq.) shall be dismissed”. The same fact that proceedings have commenced before 
a bankruptcy court is an indicator of the default of the company under OLA requirements (see Sec 203 (4) (A)) 
69 See Yellen J L, Supervision and Regulation, Testimony by Ms Janet L Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 
Washington DC, 28 September 2016, at p 3, available at www.bis.org. 
70 OLA has been put under scrutiny by the current administration, which started in 2017. Critics of the special 
insolvency procedure broadly argue that it institutionalises the idea that banks may be “too big to fail” mainly 
because Title II establishes an ad hoc fund to be accessed by the FDIC in case of need. Because the Fund may 
have an impact on public budget, it is debated whether Congress could repeal Title II with a simple majority 
only. See Bernake B, Why Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation authority should be preserved, February 28, 2017 at 
www.brookings.edu. Irrespective of the political debate, Title II establishes clear priorities and objectives in the 
use of OLA: banks should be liquidated in a manner that mitigates risk to financial stability and “minimises 
moral hazard”; creditors and shareholders will bear the losses; the original management will be replaced; and 
staff responsible for the financial condition of the company will have to bear losses too. See Dodd-Frank Act, 
Sec 204 (a) (1), (2), and (3). The FDIC is also prohibited from taking any equity interest in, or becoming a 
shareholder of, the failing company. See Sec 206 (6).The Fund is disciplined at Sec 204 (d). Ironically enough, 
an IMF study recently shows that the implicit government subsidies for systemically important banks in the 
United States may be increasing, irrespective of the existence of the Fund. See IMF (2014), Global financial 
stability report: moving from liquidity to growth –driven markets, Ch. 3, at p. 104, available at www.imf.org  
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newco à la CH 1171, it will still be administered by the FDIC72. This may hint at a possible preference 
for the efficacy of a regulatory-led insolvency procedure in case of systemically important 
institutions73.  
 Part II 
2.1. US G-SIBs resolution plans: a qualitative assessment 
CIDI and DFA plans are divided into a confidential and a public section. Regulation QQ74 indicates the 
information that needs to be provided in the DFA plans75. This includes the detailed description of 
the resolution strategy; of the corporate governance related to resolution planning; and of the 
company organisational structure. A detailed inventory and description of management information 
systems; the identification and mapping of interconnections and interdependencies; and further 
supervisory and regulatory information should also be included76. These provisions apply to both 
national and foreign based firms, although there are some specific requirements for  foreign 
institutions77. The confidential part of the plan covers the detailed strategic analysis and specific 
quantitative information on the above items. The stress scenarios banks need to cater for are 
baseline, adverse and severely adverse economic conditions78. Firms are prohibited from assuming 
the provision of any public funding to avoid their failure. 
                                                          
71 Among those analysed only one submitter specifically mentions OLA procedures to favour a recapitalisation 
under Title II in the unlikely event of their default and of the lack of viable private sector solutions. See J.P 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Resolution Plan Public Filing, September 1, 2015, at p. 3. Available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/. The possibility of creating a new-co which “parallels the 
framework of a Chapter 11 reorganization” is also mentioned in the minutes of an FDIC advisory committee, 
See Meeting of the Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
January 25, 2012, at p. 31 available at www.fdic.gov. However, it should be noted that some commentators 
exclude the possibility of creating a “bridge bank” under CH 11. This entails that the possible bridge bank, 
which will in fact be a recapitalised newco acting as a source of strength for the viable subsidiaries, is still fully 
an OLA disciplined mechanism. See FED (2011), Study on the Resolution of Financial Companies under the 
Bankruptcy Code, at p. 7 and at ft 43, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/default.htm 
72 See also the FDIC paper detailing how the FDIC could have managed an orderly wind down of Lehman 
Brothers had Title II of Dodd Frank Act been in existence at the time: The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd Frank Act, in FDIC Quarterly, Early release for the upcoming 2011, 
Volume 5, No. 2 , at www.fdic.gov. 
73 Contrary to this interpretation may run the fact that only seven respondents commented on the CIDI rule 
when it was put under consultation. Which is a relatively small number compared to the amount of banks that 
will be subjected to it and considering that respondents include banks, individuals and industry and trade 
groups. This may also reflect banks’ perception that in case of systemic crisis, they will be liquidated under 
Title II of the Dodd Frank Act, rather than under FDI Act.  
74 Regulation QQ (ft 36). 
75 More specific information requirements are included in the 2013 Guidance, (ft 47). 
76 See Regulation QQ (ft 36), 243. 4 (a) (1), (b) (j).  
77 Other minor differences are based on companies’ size. So if the covered company holds less than 100bn in 
total non-bank assets and their total deposit insured assets comprise 85% or more of the covered company’s 
total consolidated assets, it should file a tailor made version of the plan which is limited to certain 
informational items only. See Regulation QQ 243.4 (3) (ft 36).  
78 Regulation QQ (ft 36) Sec 243.4 (4) (i); FDIC-FED, Guidance for 2013 (ft 47), II (D): Stress Scenarios. 
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The 2016 and 2017 public section of the plans, which can be checked against the public feedback 
given by the Agencies79, allows us to demonstrate how US large and complex banks are now better 
prepared to face insolvency from a financial, organizational, legal, and operational, perspective. In 
fact, in both their latest feedback letters (December 2016 and 2017)80 the Agencies have expressed 
broad satisfaction at banks progresses towards resolvability. No deficiencies (the most severe 
criticism) have been identified in the 2017 plans, and only limited changes have been suggested to 
certain groups, for their 2019 submissions81. As for the deficiencies present in the 2016 plans, these 
have been considered as “adequately addressed” by all banks in their 2017 submissions82.  
While the following analysis is necessarily firm specific, these improvements have been observed 
across the board, which makes it possible to attribute them collectively to US G-SIBs.   
2.2 Financial preparedness 
Banks have now a stronger capital and liquidity base due to more specific calculation methodologies 
that consider the need of both material legal entities and branches in resolution83. Whereas 
statutory and other regulatory provisions already dictate capital amount, the Agencies subjected the 
approval of the resolution plan to the existence of an “adequate amount of loss absorbing 
capacity”84 to recapitalise those material entities that will continue operations while the parent files 
for bankruptcy. Agencies have requested both internal and external sources of total loss-absorbing 
capital (TLAC) at parent level85. TLAC then has to be supported by a capital calculation methodology 
                                                          
79 In the US, G-SIBs submitted resolution plans for the first time in 2013. However, the Agencies made public 
the feedback letters only starting from April 2016. This means that in those letters Agencies provide comments 
on the 2015 plans, and indicate the deficiencies and shortcomings that they wanted to be addressed in the 
2016 or 2017 plans. Following that, in December 2016 Agencies issued feedback letters for “Targeted 
Submissions”, namely to those banks which had deficiencies to address in their 2016 plans. Finally, in 
December 2017 the Agencies issued feedback to all eight G-SIBs commenting on the 2017 plans submission. All 
letters are available at www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm  
80 Available here www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
81 Specifically, these relate to the separability analysis of divestiture options for Wells Fargo and Goldman 
Sachs (See FDIC-FED, Feedback Letter to Wells Fargo & Company, December 2017, at p 4; FDIC-FED, Feedback 
Letter to The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc, December 2017, at p 6); to the analysis of their derivative portfolio 
(See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to Bank of America Corporation, December 2017, at p 5); or in relation to their 
legal entity rationalisation with specific reference to the possible difficulty in providing liquidity assistance to 
27 MLEs (See FDIC-FED, Feedback Letter to Morgan Stanley, December 2017, at p 5). Letters are available here 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
82 See FDIC-FED, Agency Feedback Letters for 2016 Targeted Submissions, all available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
83 Methodologies and capital calculation are detailed and required in the 2017 Guidance (ft 47), pp 4-8. For 
plans that addressed specifically capital and liquidity deficiencies see: Citigroup, October Submission, Section I: 
Public Section, October 2016, pp 16-20 and 2017 Resolution Plan, Public Section, July 1, 2017, pp 34-38; JP 
Morgan Chase, Resolution Plan Public Filing, 2016, pp 17 -20 and 34-35 and 2017 Resolution Plan Public Filing, 
p 82. Bank of America, Bank of America Corporation 2016 Resolution Plan Submission, Public Executive 
Summary, p 12-15 and Bank of America Corporation 2017 Resolution Plan Submission, Public Executive 
Summary, p 11-16; State Street Corporation, 2016 Submission for State Street Corporation: Public Section, pp 
19-27; and 2017 Resolution Plan, Public Section July 1, 2017, pp 24-30. All plans are available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm  
84 2017 Guidance (ft 39), p 4 
85 On TLAC see: Davies P,  The Fall and Rise of Debt: Bank Capital Regulation after the Crisis, at EBOLR, (2015) 
16: 491-512; Wilmarth A E Jr, SPOE +TLAC = More Bail outs for Wall Street, at Banking and Financial Services 
Policy Report, (2016), vol 35, number 3, , 1-15; Kupiec P H, Will TLAC regulations fix the G-SIB too-big-to-fail 
18 
 
which estimates the amount of capital material entities may need to operate or to be orderly wound 
down in case of parent bankruptcy (so called Resolution Capital Execution Need- RCEN)86. 
Conversely, firms also need to have the “liquidity capabilities”87 necessary to execute the resolution 
strategy. These are satisfied ensuring that the parent holding company holds sufficient High Quality 
Liquidity Assets (HQLA) to cover the sum of all stand-alone material legal entity net liquidity deficits 
over 30 days88, as calculated by the relevant internal model (so called Resolution Liquidity Adequacy 
and Positioning, RLAP)89 as well as a “methodology for estimating the liquidity needed after the 
parent’s bankruptcy filing to stabilize the surviving material entities and to allow those entities to 
operate post-filing” (Resolution Liquidity Execution Need, RLEN) 90. Agencies have also requested 
banks to take into account branches interconnectedness when estimating liquidity needs91. Cross-
border intercompany flows has been streamlined too92.  
2.3 Organisational preparedness  
Firms have broadly entered into a process of legal entities rationalisation93. As a result, many entities 
have been incorporated, divested or liquidated, foreign markets presence reduced, business lines 
linked more aptly to legal entities, and clearer lines of ownership identified94. The rationalisation 
process has been carried out following criteria that support the firm resolution strategy as well as, in 
theory at least, minimise risk to US financial stability in case of insolvency. For instance, in the case 
                                                          
problem?, at J Fin Stab, (2016), 24: 158-169. See also Wojcik K-P, Bail-in in the Banking Union, at CMLR, (2016), 
53: 91-138 (specifically at pp 115-117). 
86 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 5 
87 2017 Guidance, (ft 47) p 6 
88 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 7 
89 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 6 
90 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 7. 
91 As asked to JP Morgan Chase. See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to JP Morgan Chase, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html, at p 8 
92 See J P Morgan Chase, 2016 Resolution plan, available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/index.html 
93 “Legal entity Rationalization and Separability” was one of the key areas to be addressed in the plans listed in 
the 2017 Guidance.  
94 For instance, Goldman Sachs established clearer ownership lines as follows: “1) Operating entities should 
not have cross-holdings in each other; 2) Material operating and material service entities should not be owned 
by another material operating or material service entity; 3) There should be as few intermediate holding 
companies as regulatory or other considerations permit; and Fractional or split ownership of material entities 
should be avoided”. See Goldman Sachs, 2016 Resolution Plan, at p 52-53, available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/index.html. See also JP Morgan Chase, Resolution Plan Public Filing 
2016, at pp 21-29; BNY Mellon, BNY Mellon Resolution Plan, Public Section, October 1, 2016, pp 25-29, 
available here www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/,;  
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of JP Morgan95  criteria are an improved version of what prescribed by the Agencies96. Internal 
governance mechanisms have been enhanced too97.  
2.4 Legal Preparedness 
In preparation for resolution, firms have established intermediate clean holding companies (IHC)98. 
IHC acquisition of material legal entities in resolution should theoretically facilitate the continuation 
of activities of MLEs. Firms have also conducted detailed legal analysis to minimise obstacles arising 
from the preferred resolution strategy, including problems connected to state and bankruptcy law, 
bridge bank creation, the granting of emergency motions, and creditors’ protection99. Criticisms by 
the Agencies on this issue hint at the scale of the difficulties incurred, but these are impossible to 
evaluate since the actual legal analysis is not included in the public section. 
2.5 Operational Preparedness 
Banks are better equipped from an operational perspective because of the development of 
mechanisms to have access to critical shared services100, market infrastructure, and payment, 
                                                          
95 The bank focused on four specific areas to which apply rationalisation criteria: 1) organisation and business 
model, 2) financial resources, 3) interconnectedness, and 4) operational continuity. To each area corresponds 
sub criteria. The guiding principles in developing them were: 1) transparency; 2) actionability; 3) measurability. 
See JP Morgan Chase and Co, Resolution Plan Public Filing, 2016, p 21-22, available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/index.html 
96 In the 2017 Guidance, Agencies asked firms to develop criteria that govern firms’ corporate structure and 
arrangements between legal entities. Specifically Agencies requested that application of the criteria should: 
“(A) Facilitate the recapitalization and liquidity support of material entities, as required by the firm's resolution 
strategy. Such criteria should include clean lines of ownership, minimal use of multiple intermediate holding 
companies, and clean funding pathways between the parent and material operating entities; (B) Facilitate the 
sale, transfer, or wind-down of certain discrete operations within a timeframe that would meaningfully 
increase the likelihood of an orderly resolution of the firm, including provisions for the continuity of associated 
services and mitigation of financial, operational, and legal challenges to separation and disposition; (C) 
Adequately protect the subsidiary insured depository institutions from risks arising from the activities of any 
nonbank subsidiaries of the firm (other than those that are subsidiaries of an insured depository institution); 
and (D) Minimize complexity that could impede an orderly resolution and minimize redundant and dormant 
entities. These criteria should be built into the firm's ongoing process for creating, maintaining, and optimizing 
its structure and operations on a continuous basis.” See 2017 Guidance, (ft 28), at p 19. 
97 For banks with organisational deficiencies and for how these have been addressed see BNY Mellon, 
Resolution Plan, Public  Section, October 1, 2016, pp 25-28 and Resolution Plan, Public Section, July 1, 2017 p 
65-68; Wells Fargo, 2016 Resolution Plan Submission, Public Section, pp 7-9 and 13-15, and 2017 Resolution 
Plan, Public Section, July 1, 2017, pp 29-31; State Street, 2016 Submission for State Street Corporation: Public 
Section, p 13-18; JP Morgan Chase, Resolution Plan Public Filing 2016, pp 21-28 and 2017 Resolution Plan 
Public Filing, p 52-54; Bank of America, 2016 Resolution Plan Submission, pp 15-21, and 2017 Resolution Plan 
Submission, Public executive Summary, pp 17-21; Citigroup, October Submission, Section I: Public Section, 
October 1, 2016, 11-13. All plans are available at www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-
plans.htm 
98 This is an improvement from the 2015 plan submission, as noted in the Agencies feedback letters to all eight 
G-SIBs.  
99 As requested to BNY Mellon, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Citigroup, and JP Morgan. 
100 For instance one bank has developed a “service taxonomy” and a “taxonomy mapping” as follows: “State 
Street has developed a Service Taxonomy that captures and describes all of the services conducted within the 
organization, not just Critical Services. The Service Taxonomy is organized in a three-tiered structure, (…): Level 
One describes at a high level the business or corporate service area providing the services and is similar to 
business units or departments; Level Two is a more granular breakdown that indicates the type of services 
provided within a particular Level One area; and Level Three describes with specificity the services being 
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clearing and settlement activities in resolution101. Firms are now also better able to manage and 
quantify collateral, and have created management information systems which allow them to map 
capital, services, specific risks, and other activities to the various subsidiaries102. 
The 2016 version of the plans shows other areas of improvement from the previous submission. At 
different levels banks have: improved their monitoring of intraday liquidity risk and reduced intraday 
liquidity funding with third party repos, simplified their derivative booking model, aligned derivative 
trades, market risk and legal entity. They also  improved tracking ability of intercompany funding 
network, reduced asset size, clearly identified objects of sale to support resolution strategy, 
simplified their derivative models, and developed securities and lending playbooks103.  
In their December 2017 feedback letters, the Agencies noted  “meaningful improvements”104 over 
each G-SIB prior resolution plan in the following areas: a) capital and liquidity capabilities, including 
methodology for estimating financial resources needs;  b) the development of a framework for the 
pre-positioning of capital; c) governance mechanisms; d) contractual mechanisms among MLEs and 
with third party providers and key vendors; e) playbooks; f) ownership and funding structure and 
legal entity rationalisation; g) increased optionality in sale of assets planning. 
Besides those just mentioned, all banks “have taken important steps to enhance the firm’s 
resolvability and facilitate its orderly resolution in bankruptcy” to comply with Agencies rules on 
“total loss absorbing capacity, clean holding companies, and stays of qualified financial contracts”105. 
 
 Part III  
                                                          
provided. State Street inventoried all services provided according to this hierarchy and assessed all of the Level 
Three services to identify which of these services are Critical Services. As a global custodian, State Street often 
provides Critical Services in multiple locations, utilizing redundant capacity to provide coverage 24 hours per 
day.” Even though, contrary to expectations: “Maintaining Critical Services in each current location would not 
be necessary to the execution of State Street’s Resolution Plan. State Street's continuity plans will reflect 
maintaining Critical Services at the appropriate level in Material Entities in order to support Critical Operations 
in resolution.” See 2016 Submission for State Street Corporation: Public Section, at p 11, available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/index.html 
101 For a description of the specific operational deficiencies and how these have been addressed, see: Wells 
Fargo, 2016 Resolution Plan Submission, Public Section, October 1, 2016, p 10-12 and 2017 Resolution Plan, 
Public Section, July 1, 2017, pp 21-23  State Street, 2016 Submission for State Street Corporation: Public 
Section, at p 10-13 and 2017 Resolution Plan, Public Section July 1, 2017, at p 29-31; JP Morgan, Resolution 
Plan Public Filing, 2016, at p 32-33 and 2017 Resolution Plan Public Filing, at pp 46-48;  BNY Mellon, Resolution 
Plan, Public Section, October 1, 2016, at pp 21-24 and Resolution Plan, Public Section, July 1, 2017, at pp 47-64. 
All available at www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
102 See 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p. 12. With regard to clearing and settlement capacity in resolution, a good 
practice can be considered the one introduced by State Street, which created a “Stress Cash Positioning 
Operating Model (“SCPOM”), in which State Street documents its protocols to satisfy settlement funding 
requirements and addresses the central processing of extensions of credit in connection with settlement and 
liquidity needs”. See State Street, Resolution Plan, 2015, at p 20, available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/index.html 
103  These are improvements indicated by the Agencies in their April 2016 Letters. 





3.1. How living wills have contributed to the resolvability of US G-SIBs 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the initial debate on living wills was mostly dominated by those who 
believed in the efficacy of the instrument on the basis of the recognised benefits of ex ante planning; 
greater transparency; market discipline; and burden sharing. The commentators who were sceptical 
about the ability of such plans to deal with the failure of a large and complex organisation focused 
on: their contingency; the difficulties stemming from competing legal and insolvency regimes; 
market appetite; different currencies; and on the lack of disciplining effect due to their non-binding 
nature106. At that time however, there were no examples of recovery or resolution plans. This paper 
contributes to fill that gap.  
Based on the finding of this research, it is possible to affirm that the main benefits of introducing 
resolution plans can be traced in the improvements in group internal governance and legal 
structures. Nonetheless, SIBS are still too complex and large, and the areas of improvement present 
weaknesses as discussed in the text.  
The following sections cover banks governance mechanisms, legal entity rationalisation and group 
interconnections because of the impact these have on resolvability. The analysis considers the 
Agencies feedback and follow up actions taken by the banks. 
3.2 Banks governance mechanisms 
G-SIBs more efficient internal governance framework to handle crisis came as a consequence to the 
repairing actions taken to address the deficiencies identified by theAgencies feedback.  The 
improvements coalesce around two main areas: 1) the establishment of ad hoc committee(s) in 
charge of crisis prevention/management; and 2) the creation of “management playbooks” which 
detail actions to be taken upon the occurrence of a triggering event107.   
                                                          
106See Avgouleas et al (2013), Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action, in Journal of Financial Stability,  vol 9, 
pp.210-218; Feibeleman A (2011), Living Wills and Pre-Commitment, in 1 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. pp. 93-112; 
Goodhart,C (2010), How Should We Regulate Bank Capital and Financial Products? What Role for Living Wills?, 
2010, available at  www.futureoffinance.org.uk; Huertas T, Living Wills: How Can the Concept be 
Implemented?, speech at the Wharton School of Management, University of Pennsylvania, 12 February 2010, 
available at  www.fsa.gov.uk.; Kaufman G (2010), Living Wills: Putting the Caboose before the Engine and 
Designing a Better Engine,  available on www.ssrn.com; Feldman R (2010), Forcing Financial Institution Change 
Through Credible Recovery/Resolution Plans: an Alternative to Plan-Now/Implement-Later Living Wills, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Economic Policy paper; Packin N G (2012), The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
Living Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, in 9 Berkeley Bus L J, pp 29-93; Herring R 
(2010), Wind Down Plans as an Alternative to Bail Outs: the Cross Border Challenges, in: Scott K et al (eds), 
Ending Governments Bail outs as we know them, Hoover Institution Press, at pp 125-162; Costner C R (2012), 
Living Wills: Can a Flexible Approach to Rulemaking Address Key Concerns Surrounding Dodd-Frank Resolution 
Plans?, in 16 N C Banking Inst, pp 133-160;  Mayer S and Tarbert H (2011), Test Your Resolution: Living Wills in 
an Era of Regulatory Uncertainty, in 128 Banking L J, pp 916-946.     
107 Specifically, the 2017 Guidance requires that, among the others, governance mechanisms related to 
playbook and triggers: “should detail the board and senior management actions necessary to facilitate the 
firm's preferred strategy and to mitigate vulnerabilities, and should incorporate the triggers identified below. 
The governance playbooks should also include a discussion of (A) the firm's proposed communications 
strategy, both internal and external; (B) the boards of directors' fiduciary responsibilities and how planned 
actions would be consistent with such responsibilities applicable at the time actions are expected to be taken; 
(C) potential conflicts of interest, including interlocking boards of directors; and (D) any employee retention 
policy.” Also, “The firm should demonstrate that key actions will be taken at the appropriate time in order to 
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Firms have set up committees which, by different degrees or names, are in charge of overseeing 
“the end-to-end development and implementation of the bank” resolution strategy, and in some 
cases “provide strategic leadership to the resolvability programme”108. Other banks have also 
introduced “global recovery and resolution planning group”, “resolution planning officers”, and 
“enterprise resolution execution office”109. Whether or not included in “bankruptcy playbooks”, 
banks have also prepared the necessary first day and emergency motions to be submitted to Courts 
upon filing for bankruptcy.   
Furthermore, banks have now a system of internal management and controls able to identify ex ante 
a triggering event (based on capital, liquidity and market metrics, as requested by the Agencies), 
have codified information management systems for the senior management and the board, and 
have introduced resolution playbooks for directors and senior management which clearly indicates 
triggers for actions, the actions to be taken, and the person responsible for it. 
Agencies comments also highlighted the existence of mechanisms deemed unsatisfactory to the 
timely execution of pre-bankruptcy liquidity support to MLEs. In some cases, this was linked to the 
inexistence of clear triggers that “directly connect the liquidity and capital needed to execute the 
SPOE strategy with the decision to file for bankruptcy”110. In other cases, even where an “asset 
restriction agreement” was in place111 or a “capital contribution” arrangement was being developed, 
its content was still unsatisfactory112. In one case, the same robustness of existing governance 
mechanisms was called into question due to the existence of material errors in the plan113. 
Questions were raised across the board on how the ability of the parent to transfer funds while still 
in going concern may be hindered by US state and bankruptcy law. 
To address this, banks have “recalibrated” their framework to trigger “subsidiaries funding and 
recapitalisation action” when the firm holds sufficient liquidity and capital in the relevant entities to 
                                                          
mitigate financial, operational, legal, and regulatory vulnerabilities. To ensure that these actions will occur, the 
firm should establish clearly identified triggers linked to specific actions for: (A) The escalation of information 
to senior management and the board(s) to potentially take the corresponding actions at each stage of distress 
post-recovery leading eventually to the decision to file for bankruptcy; (B) Successful recapitalization of 
subsidiaries prior to the parent's filing for bankruptcy and funding of such entities during the parent company's 
bankruptcy to the extent the preferred strategy relies on such actions or support; and (C) The timely execution 
of a bankruptcy filing and related pre-filing actions.” See 2017 Guidance, (ft 47), p 9 and 10. 
108 See BNY Mellon Resolution Plan, Public Section, October 1, 2016, at p 33, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/. In the specific case of BNY Mellon the “Resolvability 
Steering Committee” is supported by a “Resolvability Leadership Team” which manages the day-to-day 
programme and advises the Committee of key strategic issues and execution risks.  
109 See Bank of America, Bank of America Corporation 2016 Resolution Plan submission, Public Executive 
Summary, at p 23, available at www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
110 See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to Bank of America Corporation, April 12, 2016, at p 9, and available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html 
111 FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to State Street Corporation, April 12, 2016, at p 13 available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html. 
112 See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to Citigroup Inc., April 12, 2016, at p 6, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html; and FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to Bank of 
America Corporation, p 10, available here https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html;  




“conduct an orderly wind-down”114, and are legally prepared to face creditors and fiduciary 
challenges to their resolution strategy115.  
However, the actual effectiveness of governance mechanisms should be weighed against the 
existence, or lack thereof, of compliance and enforcement mechanisms. The question arises at to 
what happens if triggers are not activated or procedures are not timely escalated or set in motion, 
for plans are silent on the matter. A possible delayed action on the banks’ side may have a severe 
impact on the effectiveness of supervisory action once the crisis manifests.     
3.3 Legal Entity Rationalisation  
Legal and organisational complexity has long been at the root of supervisory inability to resolve large 
banks in a timely and orderly manner116. To address this fault, Agencies have asked firms to align 
their legal entities to business lines in a way that supports resolution. This means that scope of the 
rationalisation process is to facilitate the recapitalization and liquidity support of material entities, to 
facilitate the sale, transfer, or wind-down of certain discrete operations, and minimize complexity 
that could impede an orderly resolution and to minimize redundant and dormant entities117. The 
FDIC and the FED have also asked firms to identify operations that can be sold or transferred in 
resolution and to facilitate buyers’ evaluation118. 
The Agencies were mostly dissatisfied with the criteria banks initially used to align legal entities to 
the resolution strategy for they: failed to establish clear ownership lines, had not been applied 
consistently to relevant MLEs, lacked “specificity”119 or allow for too much discretion which in turn 
may be used to “prioritize business as usual needs over resolution needs”120. In few cases, the 
Agencies criticised the divestiture options because of the lack of a proper separability analysis or for 
the lack of “sufficient optionality”121 under relevant market conditions.  
In a collective effort to be “responsive”122 to Agencies comments, banks engaged in a comprehensive 
review of their legal entity structure. They have identified MLEs which are relevant for resolution 
                                                          
114 See The Goldman Sachs Group, (ft 64), at p 6. 
115 But also “claims of fraudulent transfer, preference, breach of fiduciary duties, and equitable claims”. See 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Resolution Plan 2016, Submission. Public Document. September 30, 2016, at p 
23. Available here https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/  
116 Recent structural reforms in banking, such as the s.c. Volker rule in the US and the implementing measures 
of the Vickers Commission in the UK, go into the direction of remedying legal complexity too.   
117 See 2017 Guidance, “legal entity rationalization criteria”, (ft 47), at p 19. 
118 See 2017 Guidance, “legal entity rationalization criteria: separability”, (ft 47), at p 19. 
119 See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to Bank of America and to Wells Fargo, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html. In the letter to the former this is seen only as a 
shortcoming, whereas in that to the latter is considered a deficiency.  
120 See FDIC-FED, Feedback letter to State Street Bank, p 7, and ID., Feedback letter to Wells Fargo, at p 8 both 
available here https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html. 
121 See FDIC-FED Feedback letter to JP Morgan Chase, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html  
122 Reference is to the latest criteria Agencies have included in their 2017 assessment guidance which consider 
responsiveness as “whether the companies complied with the prior feedback”. See FDIC-FED, Resolution Plan 
Assessment Framework and Firm Determination 2016, available at www.fdic.gov , at p 11. In reality, a 
Damocles sword hangs over the firms which can see their size and activities axed should Agency not be 
satisfied with the plan. See above the case of Wells Fargo, at (ft 44). 
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purposes, have dissolved low activities and dormant or redundant entities123. The governance 
framework governing legal entity rationalisation has been improved too and is subject to periodic 
review.  
To address the separability concerns now firms have clearly identified “objects of sale”, namely 
those entities which can be easily sold. In one case have established frameworks to assess when the 
benefits of resolution planning “outweigh increased complexity that may serve business as usual”124, 
created data-driven tools to “store, maintain and regularly update information on operational 
interconnections across the firm in a structured, searchable and analyzable manner”125 which can 
also be used to apply the firm’s legal entity rationalisation. 
Questions remain here too.  Despite efforts to simplify their structure, their actual asset size is still 
large, the number of entities entering the resolution process will inevitably be broader than the 
MLEs considered, and the identification of objects of sale may be of little use in case of severe 
economic conditions when it may be difficult to find buyers or not to resort to fire sales of assets. 
For instance, even though Bank of America has reduced its legal entities population by approx. 60% 
(or 1600 entities), has eliminated about 40 intermediate holding companies and 250 entities are in 
line for divesture, the bank still holds over 1000 subsidiaries and branches, active in the US, Europe 
and Asia, against only seventeen material legal entities identified for resolution purposes126. At year-
end 2016, Bank of America held over 2 trillion of dollars in total assets127.  JP Morgan Chase,Bank of 
America and Citigroup are the first three G-SIBs in the FSB list128.  
3.4 Group interconnections and interdependencies 
Group interconnections and interdependencies epitomise the inherent clashes of the legal and 
economic meanings of a corporate group. From a legal perspective a group can be broadly seen as 
an agglomeration of independent legal entities and offices. From an economic point of view 
however, groups express different degrees of integration. This in turn may have an impact on the 
“legal perimeter” of the group itself. Also legal entities that belong to the group are usually 
subjected to powers of direction from the parent company, and are operationally interconnected, 
they share services and IT systems, and the financial success of one may depend upon the effective 
functioning of another. . Plans show how intricate the maze of interconnections is between material 
entities. Interconnections are a concern for resolution authorities as these represent an impediment 
to resolvability to the extent that make separation more complex129.  Even though non-material 
                                                          
123 See for instance BNY Mellon, Resolution Plan Public Section, October 1, 2016, at p 27, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
124 See State Street Plan, p 18 
125 It refers to the tool called: Connection, set up by BNY Mellon. See BNY Mellon, Resolution Plan, at p 4, 10 
and 25 available here https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
126 See Bank of America Corporation, 2016 Resolution Plan Submission, at p 4, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
127 Citi is not much smaller, with just under 2 trillion in consolidated asset at Q1 2015. See Citigroup INC, 
Resolution Plan, 1 July 2015, at p 84, available here https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
128 The 2017 list can be accessed here www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P211117-1.pdf 
129 Regulation QQ, (ft 36), Sec 243.4 (g), requires banks to “identify and map to the material entities the 
interconnections and interdependencies among the covered company and its material entities, and among the 
critical operations and core business lines of the covered company that, if disrupted, would materially affect 
the funding or operations of the covered company, its material entities, or its critical operations or core 
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entities are excluded from the plan, one may argue that a similar web exists with these too. This 
adds a further layer of complexity to resolution.  
As mentioned above, for resolution purposes banks have identified in their DFA plans the MLEs 
which will enter bankruptcy procedures. The number of MLE considered varies from 4 to 33130. MLEs 
can be broadly classified in three areas of activities: banking, broker/dealer and/or other 
investments services activities, and service providers. Geographically, they are scattered between 
the US, EU, Asia and South East Asia, as well as off shore centres. Interconnections and 
interdependencies among MLEs are instead of operational and financial nature. This distinction is in 
line with the FSB principles on the identification of critical functions and critical shared services.131 
3.4.1 Financial interconnections 
Financial interconnections among MLEs vary depending on the SIB, and it appears that the role of 
the parent holding company diverges too depending on the main business activity of the group, 
namely whether this is more investment/asset management or commercial/retail banking 
orientated. The parent can be merely a source of funding to subsidiaries or can have a more 
centralised role in contractual activities, from executing derivatives trading with subsidiaries to 
manage their interest rate or currency risk, or can act as a guarantor.  
Financial interconnections can be broadly divided into: interconnections between the parent holding 
company and its MLEs, and interconnections among identified MLEs (also called interaffiliate 
transactions). Within these two classifications, the nature and depth of financial relations may vary 
significantly. In all cases though, the parent holding company is the equity (but in some cases also 
debt) holder of subsidiaries’ capital. Whereas downstreaming of financial resources is widespread, 
upstreaming of funds (other than dividends) may be possible too. In some cases the holding, or the 
main bank subsidiary, acts as a guarantor of subsidiaries liabilities. It can also act as the main group 
contractual counterparty.  
Interaffiliate transactions cover short term, secured and unsecured funding, derivative transactions 
for hedging purposes, charges for operational support, intercompany credit lines, advances, and 
intercompany placements. All of the considered G-SIBs have now adhered to the ISDA Protocol, 
which requires no automatic stay in resolution. For those financial contracts not governed by the 
Protocol, there are no cross default termination rights. Other reasons for interaffiliates financial 
transactions are risk management, trading and investments, client facilitations and other liquidity 
needs. In addition, interaffiliate accounts, such as margin accounts, securities accounts, deposit 
accounts, and cash accounts are often used for pooling purposes. Some banks have introduced 
                                                          
business lines. Such interconnections and interdependencies may include: (1) Common or shared personnel, 
facilities, or systems (including information technology platforms, management information systems, risk 
management systems, and accounting and recordkeeping systems); (2) Capital, funding, or liquidity 
arrangements; (3) Existing or contingent credit exposures; (4) Cross-guarantee arrangements, cross-collateral 
arrangements, cross-default provisions, and cross-affiliate netting agreements; (5) Risk transfers; and (6) 
Service level agreements”. 
130 The number of material entities, excluding the parent company, range from 33 (JP Morgan Chase), 17 
(Goldman Sachs), 14 (BNY Mellon), 16 (Bank of America Corporation), 28 (Citigroup), 15 (State Street), 4 (Wells 
Fargo & Company) and 5 (Wells Fargo Bank), and 17 (Morgan Stanley). 
131 See FSB (2016), Recovery and resolution planning for systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance 
on Identification of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Services, available at www.fsb.org 
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criteria allowing for trades to be centrally cleared and when this is not possible, “non-cleared trades 
should be collateralised on a daily basis”132. In very few cases subsidiaries are financially 
independent.  
What is of chief relevance for our purposes however, is that in a few cases financial interconnections 
are extremely tight between US based MLEs and those located in foreign jurisdictions. In spite of the 
relevant provisions included in the preferred resolution strategy, these types of financial 
interdependencies may make ring fencing from foreign supervisory authorities still highly likely.  
3.4.2 Operational Interconnections and the role of critical shared services 
Operational interconnections are worth considering in detail because they are crucial to the smooth 
provision of critical shared services in resolution133, which explains why service providers are in fact 
MLEs for resolution purposes. Critical shared services enable the provision of critical functions. In the 
case of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, service providers account for almost half of the group 
MLEs134. State Street decided to centralise the provision of the majority of its critical services in the 
banking main subsidiary and in a trust company, whereas JP Morgan decided to have the banking 
entity and its subsidiaries acting as the contractor for critical services firmwide135.  
The common perception is that critical shared services are chiefly IT and personnel based: 
subsidiaries provide transaction support services, information technology and hardware 
infrastructure, software development, and network services to the operating entities as well as HR 
services including payment of remuneration and benefits, and staff supporting services for group 
employees136. Yet plans show that operational dependencies are considerably more granular and 
embedded than what common knowledge suggests137. For example, service providers may allow for 
                                                          
132 See Goldman Sachs, Resolution Plan 2015, at p 26-27 
133 For Agencies criticisms to one bank for failing to “identifying shared services and establishing SLAs and 
contingency arrangements that are critical to the successful execution of the bridge bank strategy”, see FDIC-
FED, Feedback letter to BNY Mellow, 12 April 2016, at p 6, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16031.html.       
134 Reference is to the 8 service providers over 17 MLEs in Morgan Stanley and to the 8 service providers over 
17 MLEs in Goldman Sachs. The remaining service providers are 9 in Citi, 6 in Bank of America, 3 in JP Morgan, 
5 in BNY Mellon, 4 in State Street. See ft 88 for the total number of MLEs. An interesting analysis would be to 
look at the correlation between size of the service entities and their number. However, balance sheet data are 
not available for all service MLEs of all the analysed groups.  
135 See State Street model described in ft 99 below and the one by JP Morgan. In this latter case, “the Firm’s 
main operating bank entity, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMCB"), acts as the main contracting agent firm 
wide. This results in the majority of JPMorgan Chase's third party vendor contracts for its Critical Shared 
Services being centralized in JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., its branches and subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a central repository and manager of the majority of the firmwide technology, 
real estate, personnel and other assets for the Firm’s Critical Shared Services. The concentration of assets, 
services and operations in these few entities results in contractual operational interconnectedness at 
JPMorgan Chase”. See JP Morgan Chase, Resolution Plan, at p 17, available here 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/. 
136 In some cases, staff may be directly employed by the service company and seconded to operating MLE, or 
the service company may only offer the remuneration package and other HR services. In the first case, the 
service company may also be the contractual counterparty to the firms pension plan; in other instances key 
personnel in resolution has been identified as being employed by the service company.  
137 Even though to different extent and level of details, all but one plan thoroughly describe operational 
interconnections with service providers. Wells Fargo instead provides the following succinct (and vague) 
description:  “As the Company’s largest subsidiary, WFBNA [Wells Fargo Bank, National Association] provides 
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access to Financial Markets Utilities (FMU), which are those infrastructures that facilitate payments, 
clearing and settlement of derivatives, customer securities and other cash and multiple currency 
transactions. The importance of a timely and safe access to FMU for the orderly functioning of daily 
business activity and during resolution cannot be underestimated.  
Other examples of operational interconnections range from some relatively “minor areas”, such as 
loan servicing, middle and back office support, operational support services to asset servicing138 and 
broker dealer services, remote infrastructure management services, holding real estate leases 
together with relevant property services, vendor services, holding software licensing or managing 
other IP related activities, to “major” areas such as core legal and compliance services, treasury 
functions, business and product development and marketing, marketing support, decision 
management, “data processing centers, data storage, distributed systems and command centers”139, 
“technology operations such as voice, video, system and network security, desktop, mobile and 
messaging, technology help desk, and remote access”140, ATM management, and provision of 
services to retail and credit card services globally.  In one case providers of critical shared services 
have been grouped based on clients and regions141. Depending on the banking group, the size of 
service MLEs range from hundred millions to few billions of dollars in total assets. 
                                                          
products and services to its affiliates, including each of the Company’s other material entities, and WFBNA 
provides the majority of personnel, facilities, and systems infrastructure to support the Company’s operations. 
WFBNA also provides technology and operations support to each of the Company’s other material entities. 
The support services that WFBNA receives from other material entities are limited. WFBNA receives treasury, 
legal and other support services from the Parent, certain derivative clearing services from WFS LLC [Wells 
Fargo Securities LLC], and deposit account recordkeeping services for the sweep product offered by WFA LLC 
[Wells Fargo Advisors LLC] from FC LLC [First Clearing LLC]. Other points of operational interconnectedness 
include FC LLC clearing customer securities transactions on behalf of WFS LLC, WFA LLC and FiNet [Wells Fargo 
Financial Network LLC] and WFS LLC providing capital markets products and services to the Parent, WFBNA 
and other affiliates, including underwriting, debt placement, loan syndications and derivatives clearing 
services”. See Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Resolution Plan Public 
Summary, July 1, 2015, at p 8, available here www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
138 This becomes particularly relevant in those firms, such as BNY Mellow, where asset servicing is a core 
business line. Bank of America calls its Legacy Assets and Servicing a business segment with no core business 
lines attached.  
139 See Citi, Resolution Plan 2015, available here www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/, at p 65 
140 Ibidem, p. 65 
141 See for instance State Street which relies on a system of: “Centers of Excellence (“COEs”) and Shared 
Services (“ShSs”), which are operated across the world, in order to provide comprehensive and consistent 
services to its clients. A COE is a group of personnel located throughout the world providing a single dedicated 
service across multiple client categories and utilizing centrally designed procedures and IT applications. COEs 
are utilities and ShSs representing like-activities across business lines, organized regionally and globally and 
containing client service components. ShSs also provide services across multiple client categories utilizing 
centrally designed procedures, but ShSs differ from COEs in that they focus more on regional and local needs. 
Each COE and ShS operates across multiple locations, including legal entities. This delivery model allows State 
Street to substantially reduce its geographic concentration risk by developing redundancies across regions, as 
well as to realize certain efficiencies by lowering service costs while achieving greater scale of operations and 
increasing the value of information technology investments to process standardization. Moreover, many of 
State Street’s shared internal services are provided through Centralized Corporate Service groups that are 
housed in SSBT [State Street Bank and Trust Company]. The centrality of SSBT to State Street’s operating 
model substantially mitigates the risk of loss of ShSs in a resolution scenario. Because most shared corporate 
services and many of State Street’s business operations are conducted within and delivered by SSBT, such 
services and operations would continue to be provided under the SPOE Strategy, because SSBT will be 
recapitalized and State Street entities receiving services will be able to continue to pay for them. Additionally, 
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Unfortunately, from the plan it is difficult to infer whether service MLEs also manage the group MIS, 
(management information systems). Should this be the case, a disruption in the relevant service 
entity may exacerbate the resolution process.   
The following characteristics emerge from all plans: 1) service providers may be located outside of 
the US, most often in India, Singapore, UK, Hong Kong, and Japan; 2) servicing MLEs are not merely 
“providers” of services but also receive critical services from other MLEs; 3) services are provided to 
MLEs and/or core business lines; 4) service providers tend to be financially independent from 
operating entities; 5) tend to have a substantial risk free funding model as they rely mostly on 
cash/fees, accounts receivables, and fixed assets such as computer; software; premises; and other 
equipment142; and their liabilities are mostly accounts payable and taxes; 6) they are not projected 
to enter bankruptcy proceedings143; 7) services provision is regulated by binding interaffiliate service 
level agreements conducted at arm’s length that provide for continuity in case of resolution of 
contracting entity.   
In principle, arm’s length contracts would indeed ensure continuity. However, the combination of 1) 
and 5) above raises questions about their actual efficacy. Service companies rely on cash, which 
stems mostly from the fees corresponded by contracting entities. Group financial distress can 
constitute an alarming bell to foreign regulators. They could impose limitations on the provider 
activities because the ability of the distressed entity to correspond fees can be jeopardised. Only Citi 
Bank makes it clear that in resolution service companies can access an intercompany line of credit 
should they experience cash shortages144. Irrespective of regulatory intervention145, the internal 
control systems of service MLEs located abroad may also halt the provision of relevant services. 
Given that service MLEs based in foreign jurisdiction still provide services globally, an abrupt 
interruption may precipitate the resolution phase, and hamper the ability of continuing MLEs to 
operate smoothly. 
Furthermore, whilst the majority of plans shows that service provision has been almost entirely 
centralised and regulated by interaffiliate service agreements, there are instances where it is still 
provided by third parties. In this case, group distress may give incentive to the latter to breach the 
agreement or to delay the provision of services. In the case of JP Morgan, the master vendor 
template has been modified to “to remove the suppliers’ right to terminate, and to amend the 
                                                          
the failure of SSC would not trigger local resolution proceedings for entities that provide services in support of 
Global Custody or the termination of such services. Key service contracts are also designed to maintain 
continuity of service.” 
142 Other assets may derive from “prepaid expenses related to corporate taxes; deposits [in other banks] and 
advance payments on employees insurance plans”. 
143 In one case however some service entities are classified as “objects of sale”, to be sold jointly with the core 
business line for which they provide the majority of critical services. See Morgan Stanley, 2015 Resolution Plan,  
p 43, available here www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
144 However, it should be acknowledged that such mitigation strategy may only work if credit lines still operate 
smoothly in resolution. Ironically, the same firm admits that while the terms of their service agreements have 
been strengthened “to prohibit termination of intercompany services in resolution”, this is possible “so long as 
payment is received for the service”. See Citi Bank N.A., IDI Resolution plan, Public Section, September 1, 2015, 
at p. 10 available here www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/ 
145 It should also be noted that authorities may not be able to intervene if the service company is not carrying 
out a regulated activity. Also, not in all business plans foreign authorities are considered as “material”: not 
being a material authority may hamper their ability to identify the problem in a timely fashion.  
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termination clause for each of its critical vendor contracts”146 as well as the change of control clause. 
However, the same template includes “an amended resolution-friendly termination clause and 
resolution-friendly change-of-control clause”.147 
Also, the circumstance that services are not only provided to legal entities but to business lines too 
requires a genuine coincidence of business functions with entities to make the contractual 
mechanism valid and easily enforceable.  
Finally, as seen service MLEs are intertwined because they are both receivers and providers of 
services. Unless there is a fair degree of substitutability, this may increase their level of 
interdependence, which hampers their ability to ensure continuity of services should any be an 
object of sale. Conversely, should any operating entity be sold, there must be in place a well-
functioning system that allows for an orderly “uncoupling” of the operating entity from the servicing 
one(s).  
PART IV 
4.1 The Single Point of Entry resolution strategy in practice  
The distinction between a Single Point of Entry (SPOE) and a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) strategy 
came about already in 2012 when the FSB issued a consultative document on “Making Key 
Attributes Requirements Operational”148. In that document the Board specified the main 
characteristics of each strategy and suggested the underlying conditions that have to be met for 
each to work. The SPOE “involves the application of resolution powers at the top holding or parent 
company level by a single resolution authority”, whereas the MPE “involves the application of 
resolution powers by two or more resolution authorities to multiple parts of the group (ideally 
simultaneously) including strategies in which a group is broken up into two or more separate 
parts”149. Depending on corporate structure, legal, financial or operational separation, and funding 
arrangements, one strategy may be preferable over the other. However, a combination of both can 
also be appropriate. Among the pre-requisite to make an SPOE strategy effective the FSB lists: 
“sufficient certainty on the part of host authorities that the home authorities would allow resources 
generated by a recapitalisation at holding company level or made available from other sources to be 
down-streamed to subsidiaries”150. This can be achieved by “statutory requirements for a holding 
company to support subsidiaries (such as ‘source of strength’ rules); guarantees by the holding 
company; subordination of holding company claims; and cases where subsidiaries are incorporated 
as limited liability companies”151. 
In the US, the Agencies gave both domestic and foreign based firms the following options in terms of 
possible resolution strategy: “1) The Bankruptcy or failure of all Material Entities; or 2)  Bankruptcy 
of the parent holding company or U.S. parent, as may be applicable, and a limited number (if any) of 
                                                          
146 See JP Morgan Chase, Resolution Plan. Public section, 2016, at p 32 available here 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/. 
147 Ibidem. 
148 FSB (2012), Recovery and resolution planning: Making Key attributes requirements operational. Consultative 
document, available at www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121102.pdf 
149 Ibid at p 15 
150 Ibid, at p 15 
151 Ibid at fn 8.  
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Material Entities; or 3) The Bankruptcy of one or more Material Entities within the Covered 
Company, and the Covered Company is compartmentalized in a manner that mitigates the risk that 
such Bankruptcy(ies) would result in other Material Entities entering resolution regimes” 152.  
Plans show how seven of the eight SIBs opted for a resolution strategy under 2) above, with only the 
parent holding company entering bankruptcy proceedings and the MLEs continuing operations. This 
is an example of an SPOE strategy.  
The actual plans differ among each other in some details, but overall they envisage the following 
pattern.  
The resolution process has been stylised in different stages: stress, runway, stabilisation, and post-
resolution period.  
The stress period is a pre-crisis condition where banks should intervene based on their risk 
management and contingency planning153. At this stage, some banks will also resort to capital and 
liquidity plans to inject further liquidity on the basis of the actual needs of MLEs experiencing stress.  
The runway period indicates the existence of a material financial distress which cannot be recovered 
and marks the beginning of the resolution process. Several actions correspond to this period aiming 
at transferring High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) on the basis of the relevant liquidity and capital 
methodologies (RLEN and RCEN discussed above) to MLEs. Actions indicated in the different 
playbooks will be taken. Measures aimed at employees’ retention, continuity of critical services, 
management of information systems, access to FMU, coordinating activities with regulators and 
other stakeholders are activated too. In some plans, at this stage existing lines of credit or other 
financial arrangements to upstream resources are being terminated. Two G-SIBs will also trigger a 
mechanism akin to bail in154.  
During the stabilisation period the necessary actions post CH 11 filing are implemented with MLEs 
now operating under the ownership of an intermediate holding company (IHC). MLEs will then be 
orderly wound down or sold, on the basis of what was included in the bank resolution plan.  
Finally, the post resolution period sees the satisfaction of the bankruptcy estate creditors with the 
proceeds of sales and/or the residual value of the orderly wind down proceeds, or with the proceeds 
of the IPO of a remaining company created with the subsidiaries left out of resolution.  
From a legal point of view, the SPOE strategy rests upon two main elements: 1) a contractual 
mechanism and 2) the creation of an intermediate holding company (IHC), in some cases referenced 
                                                          
152 See 2013 Guidance, (ft 47), at p 3. Considering that the 2017 Guidance is silent on the matter, we consider 
those strategies as still required. Agencies specify that bankruptcy “encompasses a proceeding under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code as well as a proceeding under another applicable insolvency regime. See ft 3 at p 3 of the 
2013 Guidance  
153 Based on the requirements of the BRRD, European banks draw up recovery plans which are then presented 
for approval to the supervisor. In the US, while it is likely to imagine that banks have similar plans, these don’t 
appear to be as regulated as in Europe. In this matter, the responsible Authority is  the FED, which issued 
guidance for the GSIB  in 2014, see FED, Consolidated Recovery Planning for Certain Large Domestic Bank 
Holding Companies, (ft 24).  




to as a NewCo or bridge vehicle. The contractual mechanism, most commonly called support 
agreement, allows for the transfer of the parent holding assets- namely holdings in the MLEs- to the 
IHC and for the activation of financial support to MLEs in the runway period. The parent holding 
company will only keep the liquidity necessary to cover the administrative burdens of entering CH 
11. The IHC will be run by a reorganisation trust appointed by the bankruptcy court. The trust will 
run the MLEs for the benefits of the bankruptcy estate. Upon filing for CH 11, an emergency transfer 
motion will be necessary to create the trust. Trustees may have to be vetted by regulators and then 
approved by the court. The petitioning parent company may have to file for so called “sec 363 sales” 
under CH 11 to validate the transfer of assets to the IHC. The trustees will act as fiduciaries to the 
bankruptcy estate and will have all the powers, and limitations, attached to that role. The plans 
make no mention as to who will actually manage the IHC, whether existing group managers, or 
managers freshly appointed by the trust.  
The IHC will have to take on the covered financial contracts that were in the hands of the parent 
company. Similarly, in those cases in which the parent holding was acting as a guarantor, this role 
will now be subsumed by the IHC. Also, it is likely to imagine that unless already existing, the IHC will 
have to obtain the necessary regulatory approval. If the banking arm of the group is to be wound 
down, one can infer that the transfer of deposits and other customers’ property to a third party will 
have to take place. 
4.2 The SPOE as an (unresolved) problem of collective regulatory action?   
The almost homogeneous choice of the SPOE as the preferred resolution strategy among the eight 
SIB can be surprising especially in those cases where a relevant number of MLEs are located in 
foreign jurisdictions, as with Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase155. In 2015 Wells Fargo opted for 
an MPE and, even though the Agencies feedback do not directly relate to the choice of resolution 
strategy, the original plan -as well as the subsequent resubmission- have both been rejected by the 
authorities. The 2017 plan was eventually approved (and it still includes an MPE strategy)156. In the 
same year BNY Mellon had opted for a two tier strategy. Under this strategy, the parent holding 
company would have filed for CH 11 with the sale of certain business lines (asset management and 
clearing services) conducted under sec 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the main banking subsidiary 
put under FDIC receivership via a bridge bank. The said bank affirmed the feasibility of running two 
proceedings in parallel due to the limited financial and operational interconnections between the 
two procedures and because of the ability of existing affiliates to provide shared services due to 
service level agreements157. However, the Agencies deemed the strategy to be operationally 
deficient particularly with regard to the continuity of shared and critical services in resolution, and to 
the bridge bank ability to operate. The former criticism insisted on the difficulties in mapping and 
then disentangling shared and critical services. The latter related mostly to the service and 
operational interdependencies among the parent holding and the bank arm, and on the actual ability 
                                                          
155 For instance, of the 33 MLEs of JP Morgan Chase, 13 are located abroad (London, Belgium, Bahamas, 
Philippines, China, Singapore, Australia, Japan, India, Germany, Ireland, Canada and Luxemburg); of the 17 
MLEs of Bank of America, 7 are located abroad (London, Frankfurt, Singapore, India and Japan). It also strikes 
as odd that BNY Mellon that operates in 35 different jurisdictions, has only 4 foreign MLEs (Indian, London and 
Belgium), of which two are branches.  
156 See Wells Fargo, 2017 Resolution Plan, Public Section, July 1, 2017, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
157 See Bank of New York Mellon 2015 and 2016 resolution plans. 
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of the bridge bank to have access to foreign deposits dually payable in the US to use as a collateral 
for intraday credit. Finally, the bridge bank ability to operate may have been hampered by legal and 
operational problems that could impede the transfer of custodial assets to the bridge bank. Agencies 
explicitly mentioned that every deficiency could have been overcome by the choice of an SPOE 
strategy, and perhaps not surprisingly the bank chose it when resubmitting its resolution plan.  
It can be argued that two technical factors may justify the uniform choice of an SPOE strategy from 
the banks perspective. The adhesion by all SIBs to the ISDA Universal Resolution Stay Protocol and 
the ex ante positioning of HQLA in the form of TLAC to MLEs. The decision to sign up to the ISDA 
Protocol  avoids a disorderly closing out of derivatives and other financial contracts in resolution and 
allows those contracts to be governed by a single set of rules globally. Cross default clauses will not 
be activated making the domino effect less likely. Possible pressures to wind down MLEs that engage 
in derivatives transactions may be eased. Counterparty trust in repayment should be preserved 
because under the Protocol the IHC becomes a guarantor. Adherence to the Protocol would make 
the close out and netting or the novation of the contracts smoother whenever waiting until maturity 
is not possible or convenient.  
However, the adhesion to an internationally agreed Protocol does not per se avoid disputes, as 
recent cases in Europe have shown158. 
Regulation YY requires the parent holding company to hold a minimum amount of external TLAC and 
other additional buffers. TLAC comprises Tier 1 regulatory capital plus eligible external long-term 
debt. To be eligible the debt has to be issued by the parent, be unsecured, be plain vanilla, be 
governed by US law, and having a maturity greater than 1 year159. TLAC instruments will contribute 
to the prepositioning of liquidity to national and foreign MLEs, which is a key provision of the plans. 
This would reassure foreign regulators on the financial soundness of the subsidiaries incorporated in 
their own jurisdictions. The plans also include arrangements for the parent to place extra capital at 
the point of resolution to foreign MLEs, which is further intended to avoid ring fencing.  
However, the said SPOE cannot guarantee that ring fencing will not be imposed.  Plans do not 
properly, or at least not in the public section, address the coordination problem with foreign 
authorities. Rather, banks seem to give for granted that the chosen resolution strategy is in the 
latter interest too. Yet is it hard to see how. One deficiency of the plans is the over-reliance on 
available financial resources in a moment of financial distress160. Even though the Agencies have 
prescribed a minimum amount of TLAC, market dynamics and the severity of the crisis event at the 
point of resolution may induce foreign authorities to take conservative actions. Also there is little or 
no consideration of the so called “double leverage” problem. Banks may fund the extra capital 
needed with debt instruments. However, the servicing of that debt may rely “on flows of dividend 
                                                          
158 See LB EHF v Raiffaisen [2017] EWHC 522 (Comm), 20.3.2017; and Lehman Brothers Int v Exxonmobil [2016] 
EWHC 2699 (Comm), 28.10.2016 
159 In Europe, see Directive 2017/2399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 
amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy, 
in OJ L 345/96. 
160 The FSB too recommended minimum amount of TLAC financial companies should hold to ensure loss 
absorbency and recapitalisation capacity see FSB (2015), Principles of Loss-Absorbency and Recapitalisation 




income which are uncertain and at the discretion of local boards and supervisors across the 
group”161. This may also put more pressure on unregulated entities162. It is not a case then that in the 
UK the PRA is specifically consulting on this problem163. The Agencies expressed a similar concern in 
their 2017 feedback letter to Morgan Stanley164, when acknowledging that the large number of MLE 
included in the plan –coupled with their foreign location- increases the risk of misallocation of 
financial resources. And that “Projected pre-bankruptcy estimates could fall short of what one or 
more MEs need in resolution, including for purposes of stabilizing the firm”165.Never mentioned is 
the accounting method used to evaluate the assets that can be sold or transferred, whose value may 
therefore fluctuate under different scenarios. Much will also depend on the maturity date of the 
debt component of TLAC at the point of resolution, to avoid a sudden withdraw of funds by TLAC 
holders. This may be the reason why Regulation YY establishes a minimum maturity date. However, 
a grandfathering provision had to be included to cover those debt instruments issued by the SIBs 
before 31 December 2016. Furthermore, plans indicate that the runway period spans over a week 
end. As experience has shown in practice, authorities located in different continents may doubt the 
actual ability of the parent before -and of the IHC after -to deliver the needed financial resources 
especially in such a short timeframe. The uncertainty over whether foreign MLEs will be given the 
same consideration of the national MLEs in case of scarce available liquidity may tip the balance 
towards ring fencing.  Foreign, and domestic authorities too, may also question the financial 
capabilities of the IHC, since nothing is said on its own source of funding. In normal times, these 
would be dividends, lines of credit and other upstream of resources from the subsidiaries. However, 
in a crisis scenario none of the above is feasible. Even if the IHC is in effect an asset management 
company, its own financial sustainability should be taken into account. 
Even though Cross Border Crisis Management groups should be in place for SIBs and progress has 
been made on international cooperation166, as the joint FDIC-Bank of England paper on the preferred 
resolution strategy for SIBs167shows, mechanisms based on MoUs are still not binding. In fact, not 
even the same resolution plan has any binding value over the bank, regulators and judges.  
Despite the mentioned progress, from a political perspective supervisory authorities in Europe seem 
to be wary of a specific US provision that forces foreign large banks to create a US incorporated 
holding company to continue operations. Therefore, they have recently put forward a proposal168   
                                                          
161 See Woods S, Geofinance, Speech delivered at the Mansion House City Banquet, 4 October 2017, available 
here www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches, at p 4. 
162 Ibidem  
163 See PRA, Groups Policy and Double Leverage, CP 19/07, October 2017, available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2017/groups-policy-and-double-leverage 
164 FDIC-FED, Feedback Letter to Morgan Stanley, 19 December 2017, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm 
165 Ibidem at p 6 
166 See Russo C, Third Country Cooperation Mechanisms within the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: will 
they be Effective? , Ch 8, in «Bank resolution: the European regime», eds by Binder and Singh, OUP, 2016, at p 
157, and Nieto M (2014), Third Country Relations in the Directive Establishing a Framework for the Recovery 
and the Resolution of Credit Institutions, Banco de España working paper, available at www.bde.es, for a 
discussion on these groups as well as for a critical analysis of the effectiveness of cooperation in cross border 
resolution. 
167 See BoE-FDIC, Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, 10 December 2012 
168 See art 21b of the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial 
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directed to foreign large banks to set up an IHC in the Union. This move may indicate a preference in 
Europe for an MPE strategy for US G-SIBs . 
Finally, whereas the SPOE is focused on MLEs only, one should not underestimate the behaviour of 
regulatory authorities located in jurisdictions other than those of the MLEs. They could ring fence 
the assets too, even if the subsidiaries are not seen as “material”. Yet depending on the actual crisis, 
the financial resources of those other entities may be used for resolution purposes. Their ring fence 
may send shocking waves to the markets and have a signalling effect to other regulators.  
Coordination may be an issue at domestic level too. Despite the Dodd –Frank attempted 
simplification, the US financial and banking supervisory framework is still composed of a patchwork 
of authorities that operate at state and federal level on the basis of the companies’ activities. The 
orderly wind down of MLEs will require cooperation and coordination of different authorities, under 
separate legal regimes, particularly in the case of stock and commodities broker- dealers and 
insurance companies. These could not be resolved under CH 11 or under the FDIA: the broker-
dealers will have to be liquidated by the SIPC Trustee pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection 
Act (SIPA) and CH 7of the Bankruptcy Code169, whereas insurance companies are normally resolved 
under relevant state law. In fact, not even a deposit taking institution could access CH 11, having to 
be resolved under the FDIA instead. More recently the FDIC has issued a final rule on its powers 
under Title II however, which covers certain aspects related to insurance companies170 as well as a 
joint draft rule with the SEC to regulate the insolvency of broker-dealers under Title II171. 
4.3 The choice of a SPOE as a case of “regulatees capture”? 
We need to consider whether the SPOE can actually be the Agencies’ preferred resolution strategy. 
A first indicator in this sense is the case of the only bank that opted for a two tier resolution strategy. 
From a theoretical point of view the operational objections raised to that strategy may well be 
applicable to an SPOE ceteris paribus, as in fact have been raised to other banks which similarly 
lacked the ability to disentangle operational and financial interconnections. Therefore, it is unclear 
why the Agencies indicated that the deficiencies could have been overcome by the choice of a 
“different” resolution strategy. We should also bear in mind that resolution plan drafting does not 
happen in a vacuum but is instead the product of a constant dialogue with the authorities.  
The second aspect is that the Agencies never credibly gave banks the option of an MPE as a possible 
resolution strategy. If we look back to what included in the 2013 Guidance, mentioned above, 
nothing is said on the possibility of having multiple insolvency proceedings, or sub groups of 
insolvencies, on the basis maybe of business lines or jurisdictions. The options allow for: the failure 
of the parent holding only and maybe, but not necessarily, that of some MLEs (n2), the 
contemporary failure of all material entities (n1), or of only some of them with their parent 
                                                          
holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures 
COM/2016/0854 final - 2016/0364 (COD), available here www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0854 
169 See FED, Study on the resolution, (ft 71), at p 3. 
170 FDIC, Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 12 CFR part 380. 
171 FDIC-SEC, Covered Broker Dealer Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 12 CFR part 380 RIN 3064-AE39, 17 CFR part 302. 
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continuing operations in a way that actually avoids other material entities entering resolution 
regimes (n3). The insolvency of multiple parts of the group (ideally simultaneously) with a possible 
break up into separate sub groups under the responsibility of two or more resolution authorities is 
not mentioned. Option n 1 is extremely disruptive for any business so it is not a viable alternative. 
The final reason relates to the requests made by the Agencies to amend group structure. The 
practical outcome of these was to have a group whose organisational and legal structure match 
perfectly the FSB indications of the preconditions that needs to be in place for an SPOE to work172. 
The question now arises as to why the SPOE may be the Agencies preferred resolution strategy. 
There are three, for obvious reasons merely speculative, possible answers to this question. One 
relates to the long-standing coordination problems among supervisory authorities. An MPE requires 
authorities’ ability to take coordinated actions towards the achievement of a common goal (orderly 
resolution). However, national sovereignty and financial stability, fiscal implications and burden 
sharing, different legal regimes which grant different degrees of protection to creditors and 
shareholders, are all possible obstacles mostly unaccounted for in the plans. In this sense, taking 
exclusive national control on the insolvency of a G-SIB may be a safe harbour.  
The second answer relates to the inability of the US legal regime to deal with multiple competing 
insolvencies even at national level. Given the described deficiencies of CH 11, it is probably more 
efficient to deal with the insolvency of the parent institution only -which is merely a pure holding 
company -than having to coordinate among different state and federal authorities with different 
legal regimes. It is not a case then that, should the insolvency be particularly severe, US authorities 
can use the powers and tools included in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act instead of CH 11.  
Title II brings us the final reason as to why Agencies may prefer an SPOE. The latter is the resolution 
strategy that will be adopted by the FDIC under Title II. In this respect, the SPOE drafted by banks 
would still work as a useful point of reference for the FDIC, mutatis mutandis.  
Even though US Agencies may prefer the use of CH 11 to deal with the insolvency of a G-SIB, a 
cursory analysis of the Chapter exposes other legal problems which may affect the smooth running 
of the procedure. For instance, any interested party may request the appointment of a case trustee 
or examiner at any point prior to confirmation of the CH 11 plan, if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that those in control of the debtor in possession participated in gross mismanagement, 
fraud, dishonest or criminal conduct in the management of the debtor or of the debtor’s financial 
reporting 173. The case trustee/examiner will be now responsible for managing the debtor’s assets 
and even for the filing of the reorganisation plan which in turn may delay its approval.  
Clarification is also needed on the applicability of the «363 sales» procedure, namely the one that 
regulates the use, sale or lease of the property of the estate outside of ordinary business174. «363 
                                                          
172 For a detailed list please see FSB, Recovery and resolution planning, (fn 135), Annex two; and FSB, Recovery 
and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective 
Resolution Strategies, July 2013, from p 14, available here www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130716b.pdf?page_moved=1  
173 See 11 U.S.C par 1104 (a)-(e). 
174 At 11 U.S.C par 363 (b). 
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sales» have bene used in the Lehman bankruptcy175 and plans make often reference to them, yet it is 
argued that “it may be the company’s primary regulator that has arranged for a sale of the company 
(or its assets) to a third party. There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code, however, for a 
government entity or a primary regulator of a financial company to file a motion for an order 
approving a 363 sale.”176 For the interpreter the reference to those sales clarifies the timing of the 
relevant transfers. MLEs will be recapitalised before the holding files for bankruptcy and then, once 
filed, the transfer of parents’ assets to the IHC will take place under sec. 363 with the approval of the 
court. What remains unclear however, is the mechanism that will be used to upstream losses to the 
parent holding. Whereas in Europe resolution authorities will use the bail –in tool, in the US the 
application of this mechanism seems to be more nuanced as it is only acknowledged for resolution 
under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Problems may arise with a possible use of a bridging institution. As it has bene noted177, CH 11 does 
not allow for the creation of a bridge bank, which means that any vehicle needed for the transfer of 
assets should be in place already at the time of bankruptcy, which may be the reason why Agencies 
have asked G-SIBs to create a clean holding company. However, during the actual bankruptcy 
proceedings other bridging vehicles may need to be created to support 363 sales. 
Finally, at least from the public section, there still seems to be an oversimplification of the sheer 
complexity and size of systemically important institutions. As noted already above, there are only 
relatively few MLEs in the group, which strikes as odd compared to the consolidated size and total 
number of subsidiaries, branches, SPV, other vehicles, and ownership interests which all form part of 
the group. In resolution, group’s actual size and interconnections may emerge more prominently.  
What is not being highlighted in the plans is also that actions would need to be taken by relevant 
regulatory authorities to facilitate the execution of the strategy in terms of rights, contingent claims 
and obligations of involved parties, included creditors and shareholders rights. This analysis may 
however form part of the confidential part. 
 
Conclusions 
Banking resolution is at the forefront of regulatory agendas on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, it 
seems possible to address the progress made because of a higher degree of transparency at both 
private and public level. Resolution authorities and banks in the EU should also adopt such degree of 
transparency because it improves the accountability of both and reduces agency costs while at the 
same time makes no harm to banking activities.  
Notwithstanding the existence of weaknesses and imperfections, in terms of organisational and legal 
improvements US G-SIBs are today better suited to withstand insolvency. This is thanks to the 
requirement to draw up a resolution plan and to address the deficiencies identified by the Agencies.  
The resolution strategy opted for by the almost entirety of US G-SIBs is an SPOE. However, the latter 
may decrease the chances of an orderly wind-down. This is because the SPOE may not be feasible 
                                                          
175 See FED, Study on Resolution, (ft 71) at p. 14 
176 FED, Study on resolution, (ft 71), at p 14 
177 Ibidem, p 7 
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due to coordination problems with third countries authorities and to legal impediments attributable 
to the inability of CH 11 to deal with the insolvency of large and complex financial institutions. The 
actual availability of prepositioned financial resources at material entities level may be at stake too.  
Finally, despite the existence of common standards at international level, EU and US authorities 
seem to differ in terms of approach to failure, with the former opting for resolution tools and the 
latter for bankruptcy proceedings.  
There is also the risk that recognition of foreign G-SIBs SPOE resolution strategy may not be possible. 
For the requirement, existing in the US and proposed in the EU, to set up an IHC may affect the 
smooth execution of an SPOE strategy. This would in turn regionalise procedures, transforming an 
SPOE in an MPE in fact.  
The existence of two different types of plans covering the same foreign companies adds a further 
layer of complexity and uncertainty in a cross border insolvency. EU authorities may probably feel 
more comfortable with Title II proceedings.  
A final difference which may skew the incentives to implement a US G-SIB resolution strategy in 
Europe is the possibility that EU authorities have to resort to state aid , within certain limitations, as 
well as to precautionary recapitalisation measures (art 32 (4) BRRD) in case of a serious disturbance 
in the economy and a threat to financial stability. Those measures can be applied to EU MLEs of a 
failing US G-SIB, therefore changing resolution dynamics from what initially planned.  
 
 
 
